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The Evolving Law of Employee
Noncompete Agreements:
Recent Trends and an Alternative
Policy Approach
Michael J. Garrisonn and John T. Wendtnn
I. INTRODUCTION
Kai Fu Lee earned his doctorate from the School of Computer Science at
Carnegie Mellon. While there he developed the world’s first practical and
accurate speech recognition system (the SPHINX system), which allowed
for natural and continuous speech and which could handle tens of
thousands of words, multiple voices, and even accents.1 Lee first worked
at Apple Computer, serving as vice president of the interactive media
group that developed QuickTime, QuickDraw 3D, QuickTime VR, and
PlainTalk speech technologies. He left Apple to become the vice president
and general manager of Silicon Graphics (SGI), where he was responsible
for several product lines and SGI’s corporate Web strategy.2 He later left
SGI to join Microsoft.
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1Ed Frauenheim, Who in the World is Kai-Fu Lee?, CNET NEWS.COM (Aug. 2, 2005), http://www.
news.com/Who-in-the-world-is-Kai-Fu-Lee/2100-1014_3-5814520.html; Verne Kopytoff, Highly
Respected Scientist at Center of Battle, Ruling Expected Today on Extending Curb of Ex-Microsoft Exec’s
Duties at Google until Trial, SFGATE.COM (Sept. 13, 2005), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.
cgi?f=/c/a/2005/09/13/BUGL2EMMGJ1.DTL&hw=kai+fu+lee&sn=001&sc=100.
2Biography of Kai-Fu Lee, http://www.google.com/corporate/execs.html#kaifu (last visited
Oct. 4, 2007).
At Microsoft, he served as corporate vice president of the Natural
Interactive Services Division (NISD),3 where he was a key player in
Microsoft’s administration. In that position, Lee was
responsible for the development of the technologies and services for making
the user interface simpler and more natural. NISD includes technologies and
products for speech, natural language, advanced search and help, and
authoring and learning technologies. . . . [Lee] was the founder of Microsoft
Research Asia, which has since become one of the best research laboratories in
the world, with a prolific publication and product transfer record.4
While Lee was at Microsoft, Google, Inc. recruited him to lead its
China research and development center, which triggered lawsuits in
Washington and California5 and sparked a public relations battle between
the rival high-tech firms. On July 19, 2005, the same day that Lee accepted
the position of Vice President of Engineering and President of Google
China, Microsoft filed for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction against Lee and Google alleging breach of an employee
confidentiality and noncompete agreement between Lee and Microsoft.6
In a press release simultaneous with the lawsuit, Microsoft stated:
Creating intellectual property is the essence of what we do at Microsoft, and we
have a responsibility to our employees and our shareholders to protect our
intellectual property. As a senior executive, Dr. Lee has direct knowledge of
Microsoft’s trade secrets concerning search technologies and China business
strategies. He has accepted a position focused on the same set of technologies
3Frauenheim, supra note 1.
4Hua Yuan Science and Technology Association, Events and News, http://www.hysta.org/
event_detail.php?id=135 (last visited Oct. 1, 2007).
5See Microsoft Corp. v. Lee, No. 05-2-23561-6 SEA (Super. Ct. Wash. Sept. 13, 2005) (order
granting preliminary injunction), http://www.metrokc.gov/kcsc/docs/Microsoftprelim.pdf;
Google, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 415 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
6Lee, No. 05-2-23561-6 SEA. The Agreement contained the following provision at paragraph
9:
While employed at Microsoft and for a period of one year thereafter, I will not (a) accept
employment or engage in activities competitive with products, services or projects
(including actual or demonstrably anticipated research or development) on which I
worked or about which I learned confidential or proprietary information or trade secrets
while employed at Microsoft.. . . .
Google, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1019.
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and strategies for a direct competitor in egregious violation of his explicit
contractual obligations.7
In response to Microsoft’s suit, Lee and Google argued, ‘‘This lawsuit is a
charade . . . Indeed, Microsoft executives admitted to Lee that their real
intent is to scare other Microsoft employees into remaining at the
company.’’8 Lee stated that in a July 15, 2005, meeting Microsoft chairman
Bill Gates said, ‘‘Kai-Fu, [CEO] Steve [Ballmer] is definitely going to sue
you and Google over this. He has been looking for something just like this,
someone at a VP level to go to Google. We need to do this to stop Google.’’9
On September 13, 2005, a King County (Washington) Superior
Court judge issued a limited preliminary injunction against Lee and
Google.10 The court found that, although Lee had signed the noncompete
agreement, a question for trial remained as to whether there was sufficient
consideration for the covenant.11 The court also found that ‘‘Lee misled
Microsoft about his intention to return to Microsoft following his sabbatical
and he continued to have access to Microsoft’s proprietary information
after he decided to leave Microsoft to join one of its competitors without
informing Microsoft.’’12 The court additionally determined that Lee
‘‘assist[ed] Google while he was still employed at Microsoft,’’13 that he
‘‘worked on products, services or projects’’ about Microsoft’s plans in
China, and that he received ‘‘confidential, proprietary or trade secret
information’’ regarding Microsoft’s China plans.14
7Press Release, Microsoft Corp., Statement from Microsoft Regarding Legal Action Against
Google and a Former Executive (July 19, 2005), http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/
2005/jul05/07-19GoogleStatement.mspx.
8A Microsoft ‘Charade’: Google Attacks Lawsuit over Hiring, INT’L HERALD TRIB., July 29, 2005,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/07/28/business/google.php (quoting a Google filing with the
Washington Superior Court).
9Ed Frauenheim, Lee looked up Google, wasn’t poached, NEWS.COM, July 28, 2005, http://news.
com.com/2061-10788_3-5809107.html?tag=nl (quoting declaration of Kai Fu Lee filed with
Washington Superior Court).
10Lee, No. 05-2-23461-6 SEA.
11Id. at 7.
12Id. at 7–8,
13Id. at 8.
14Id.
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The court read the noncompetition and nonsolicitation paragraph of
Lee’s Microsoft Employment Agreement15 narrowly. It found that Lee had
given only ‘‘general, non-technical advice to Google about doing business
in China,’’ which did not violate the agreement, provided that Lee did not
‘‘recruit from Microsoft or use any confidential information about Micro-
soft.’’16 Hence, while Microsoft was entitled to a preliminary injunction
restricting Lee’s activities, Microsoft had not produced sufficient evidence
to enjoin Lee from working for Google and establishing its Development
Facility in China.17
In the wake of the court’s ruling, both sides claimed that they
prevailed. Microsoft said, ‘‘We are pleased with our victory in court today.
The court entered an injunction that restricts the work Dr. Lee can do for
Google, preventing him from working on speech, natural language and
search technologies, as well as setting the overall research and develop-
ment course for Google China.’’18 In a posting to Google’s official Web log,
associate general counsel Nicole Wong stated, ‘‘We’re thrilled, and he’s
excited to get right to work on several big things, including recruiting,
building our Chinese R&D center, and related government relations. . . .
There are some restrictions, but the ruling basically allows Dr. Lee to do
what we’ve wanted him to be able to do.’’19
Welcome to the modern world of employee noncompete agreements.
Microsoft and Google are in a twenty-first–century clash of the titans in
today’s multibillion-dollar knowledge-based economy. This is a war about
competition and unfair competition, an attempt to balance an employer’s
desire to protect its business assets and the employee’s interest in professional
mobility. And it is a delicate balance. Traditionally, courts favored the
employee, reviewing noncompete agreements under a common law reason-
15See supra note 6 for the full language of the paragraph.
16Lee, No. 05-2-23461-6 SEA, at 9.
17Id. at 10 (‘‘Microsoft has not sufficiently shown that it has a clear legal or equitable right to
enjoin Dr. Lee, pending trial, from Establishing and Staffing a Google Development Facility in
China.’’).
18Press Release, Microsoft Corp., Updated: Statement from Microsoft Concerning Superior
Court’s Preliminary Injunction Order in Case of Google and Kai-Fu Lee (Sept. 13, 2005),
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2005/sep05/09-13GoogleStatementPR.mspx.
19Posting of Nicole Wong to Official Google Blog, Judge clears way for Dr. Lee, http://
googleblog.blogspot.com/2005/09/judge-clears-way-for-dr-lee.html (Sept. 13, 2005, 11:57:00
PST).
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ableness test that placed a heavy burden on employers to justify the need for
and the reasonableness of any postemployment restraint. This common law
approach was complemented by state restraint of trade statutes that limited
covenants not to compete to a greater extent than under the common law.
Overall, the traditional legal approach to postemployment restrictions, dis-
cussed in Parts II and III, was hostile to employee noncompete agreements.
Gradually, however, many jurisdictions adopted a more relaxed
approach to restrictive covenants in the employment context. The devel-
opment of what we will refer to as the modern approach is discussed in
Part IV. Under it, many states altered the common law standards, broad-
ening the permissible scope of employee noncompete agreements. Many
of these jurisdictions also empowered courts to reform and, thereby,
rewrite overbroad restraints on former employees, rather than penalize
employers whose noncompete covenants were unreasonable. While tradi-
tional standards favored the employee by imposing a heavy burden on
employers seeking to enforce restrictive covenants, the modern approach,
under which broad noncompete agreements have been allowed in many
jurisdictions, represented a shift in the law in favor of employer interests.20
A review of the most recent judicial opinions addressing employee
noncompete agreements21 and some complementary statutory develop-
ments reveals a new trend in the law. Discussed in Part V, the opinions
suggest a heightened judicial scrutiny of employee noncompete agree-
ments, the effect of which is to restrict the enforceability of employee
noncompete agreements.22 These recent decisions represent a full-scale
assault on the modern approach.
20We recognize that characterizing the law as favorable to employers or as pro-employer may
be oversimplifying the discussion. Strong enforcement of employee noncompetes favors
incumbent employers over new or prospective employers. However, from the employee’s
perspective, strong enforcement can legitimately be viewed as pro-employer. And if one views
the law of employee noncompetes as determining the ownership of human capital develop-
ment in the workplace, then it is appropriate to characterize the law as either favoring the
rights of employers or employees.
21This article focuses primarily on state supreme court decisions that have doctrinal significance
to the law of employee noncompetes and that were issued between 1999 and 2006.
22We do not contend that recent noncompete decisions are uniformly in favor of employee
mobility. See, e.g., Idbeis v. Wichita Surgical Specialists, 112 P.3d 81, 89 (Kan. 2005)
(recognizing referral services as a legitimate interest in justifying physician noncompete
agreement); Wood v. Acordia of W. Va., Inc., 618 S.E.2d 415, 422 (W.Va. 2005) (considering
nonsolicitation agreement less restrictive of employees’ rights and the market than other
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A similar and parallel trend has occurred in the doctrine of inevitable
disclosure of trade secrets, a theory under which the courts prohibit an
employee’s subsequent employment opportunities to prevent threatened
misappropriation of trade secrets. The doctrine has come under judicial
attack, with some jurisdictions rejecting it outright and others severely
limiting its application based on policy considerations. The recent change
in judicial attitude toward the inevitable disclosure doctrine is discussed in
Part VI.
The emerging trend in the law of employee noncompete agreements
suggests that courts are generally more inclined to invalidate employee
noncompete agreements than under the modern approach and that the
law of employee noncompete agreements is becoming more protective of
the employee’s interest in mobility. This heightened scrutiny of employee
noncompete agreements reflects some of the fundamental changes taking
place in the economy and in the workplace. Part VII discusses the
changing nature of the employment relationship, the evidence of the need
for information sharing in the new economy, and the implications these
developments have on the emerging law of employee noncompete agree-
ments. Strong enforcement of employee noncompete agreements is not
only inconsistent with the emerging information-age employment relation-
ship, where employee mobility is a key feature, but such enforcement may
also have detrimental economic effects by inhibiting rapid knowledge
transfers that stimulate technological change.
Given the new trend in employee noncompete law and the funda-
mental changes taking place in the economy, a wholesale reassessment of
the traditional common law and modern approaches to employee non-
compete agreements is necessary. Part VIII develops our proposed policy
framework, outlining the rationale for a new approach to such agreements
and the beneficial effects of the proposed change in the law. This
alternative framework differentiates an employer’s interests in goodwill
postemployment restraints). Some opinions appear to follow the trend we have identified, but
the impact of these decisions on the law is unclear. E.g., Montana Mountain Products v. Curl,
112 P.3d 979, 981 (Mont. 2005) (finding employee noncompete agreement unenforceable as
overbroad when it effectively prevented the employee from working in his field where he
lived, thereby apparently putting some teeth in the third prong of the Montana reason-
ableness test, which requires a noncompete agreement not to be ‘‘so large in its operation as to
interfere with the interests of the public’’). Other cases clearly follow the trend, as with recent
opinions holding employee noncompete agreements to be nonassignable. E.g., Traffic
Controls Servs. v. United Rentals Northwest, Inc., 87 P.3d 1054, 1060 (Nev. 2004).
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and trade secrets. Under our proposal, the employer’s interest in goodwill,
including secret customer lists, would be protected under carefully tailored
noncompete agreements. Recent opinions have demonstrated that the
common law reasonableness standard can be adjusted to prevent only
those forms of postemployment competition that are unfair because of the
exploitation of the former employer’s customer relationships.
We contend, however, that the present approach to trade secret
protection under employee noncompete law creates a serious risk of
unnecessarily stifling employee mobility and innovation. Merely adjusting
the common law reasonableness test will not adequately protect these
important societal interests. Rather, a more fundamental change in the
law is required. Under the proposed framework, the mere potential for
trade secret misappropriation would no longer be considered a legitimate
justification for a postemployment restraint. Noncompete agreements
would not be enforceable to protect trade secrets, although proprietary
business information would continue to be protected from actual or
threatened misappropriation under confidentiality agreements and state
trade secret law. More importantly, the courts would be specifically empow-
ered to prevent employment of a former employee based on the inevitable
disclosure of trade secrets. Compared to the common law approach to the
enforcement of employee noncompete agreements, we believe the inevi-
table disclosure doctrine provides a more balanced and equitable resolution
of the competing interests of employers and employees with regard to trade
secrets and postemployment competition. Our proposed framework relies
on a carefully framed injunction based on demonstrated necessity (inevit-
ability). Our approach is superior to enforcing a noncompete agreement
based only on the potential for trade secret misappropriation, because it
supports a climate of employee mobility and information sharing while
providing businesses an adequate level of protection for their trade secrets.
II. NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS IN THE EMPLOYMENT
CONTEXT: THE COMMON LAW APPROACH
As a matter of public policy, courts have traditionally looked upon
agreements not to compete with disfavor.23 Such restrictions on employees
23E.g., Kallok v. Medtronic, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 356, 361 (Minn. 1998) (‘‘In Minnesota,
employment noncompete agreements are looked upon with disfavor, cautiously considered,
2008 / Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete Agreements 113
were prohibited under the early English common law24; however, over
time, the common law prohibition against noncompete agreements loo-
sened. The courts recognized that such agreements can be legitimate if
they serve business interests other than the restriction of free trade.25
Thus, agreements not to compete ancillary to an employment relationship
have been permitted, subject to a reasonableness requirement.26
The common law reasonableness approach is an attempt to balance
the conflicting interests of employers and employees as well as the societal
and carefully scrutinized.’’ (internal quotes and citation omitted)). The seminal article on
employee noncompete agreements is Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73
HARV. L. REV. 625 (1960). For recent commentary on the law of employee noncompete agreements,
see generally Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not to Compete in a Knowledge Economy: Balancing
Innovation from Employee Mobility against Legal Protection for Human Capital Investment, 27
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287 (2006); Yuval Feldman, Experimental Approach to the Study of
Normative Failures: Divulging of Trade Secrets by Silicon Valley Employees, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL’Y 105 (2003); Todd M. Foss, Comment, Texas, Covenants Not to Compete, and the Twenty-First
Century: Can the Pieces Fit Together in a Dot.Com Business World?, 3 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 207
(2003); Joan T.A. Gabel & Nancy R. Mansﬁeld, The Information Revolution and its Impact on the
Employment Relationship: An Analysis of the Cyberspace Workplace, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 301 (2003);
Thomas M. Hogan, Note, Uncertainty in the Employment Context: Which Types of Restrictive
Covenants Are Enforceable?, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 429 (2006); John Dwight Ingram, Covenants
Not to Compete, 36 AKRON L. REV. 49 (2002); Cristin T. Kist, Comment, Blocked Airwaves: Using
Legislation to Make Non-Compete Clauses Unenforceable in the Broadcast Industry and the Potential
Effects of Proposed Legislation in Pennsylvania, 13 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 391 (2006); Ted Lee &
Leila Ben Debba, Backdoor Non-Competes in Texas: Trade Secrets, 36 ST. MARY’S L.J. 483 (2005);
Louis J. Papa, Employee Beware! Employment Agreements and What the Technology Related Employee
Should Know and Understand before Signing That Agreement: A Practical Guide, 19 TOURO L. REV.
393 (2003); Sela Stroud, Non-Compete Agreements: Weighing the Interests of Profession and Firm, 53
ALA. L. REV. 1023 (2002); Jennifer Turner, Note and Comment, Noteboom: A Dramatic Deviation
from Texas’ Stand against Non-Competition Clauses among Lawyers, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 1011 (2006);
Kenneth J. Vanko, You’re Fired! And Don’t Forget Your Non-Compete . . .’’: The Enforceability of
Restrictive Covenants in Involuntary Discharge Cases, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 1 (2002); Mike J.
Wyatt, Comment, Buy Out or Get Out: Why Covenants Not to Compete in Surgeon Employment
Contracts are Truly Bad Medicine, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 715 (2006).
24The English common law prohibition dates back to 1414 and the famous Dyer’s Case, Y.B.
Mich. 2 Hen. 5, f. 5, pl. 26 (C.P. 1414). It has been noted that the original common law position
was designed to prevent employers from circumventing the established customs of appren-
ticeship. Blake, supra note 23, at 632.
25United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 293 (6th Cir.), aff ’d, 175 U.S. 211
(1898).
26For a discussion of the evolution of the common law reasonableness approach to employee
noncompete agreements in the United States, see T. Leigh Anenson, The Role of Equity in
Employment Noncompetition Cases, 42 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 9–14 (2005).
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interests in open and fair competition. Employers have a legitimate interest
in preventing unfair competition through the misappropriation of busi-
ness assets by former employees.27 On the other hand, employees have a
countervailing interest in their own mobility and marketability.28 Society
has interests in maintaining free and fair competition and in fostering a
marketplace environment that encourages new ventures and innovation.29
There is a complementary public interest in preventing employers from
using their superior bargaining position to unduly restrict labor markets.30
Given these competing interests, the common law approach allows em-
ployee noncompete agreements but imposes significant limits on restrictive
covenants to assure that they are not overly burdensome to employees and
harmful to the marketplace.
Under the common law approach, the employer must demonstrate a
legitimate commercial reason for any agreement not to compete to ensure
that the agreement is not a naked attempt to restrict free competition.
Merely preventing competition from a former employee is not a sufficient
justification for a noncompete agreement, even if the employee received
training or acquired knowledge of a particular trade during his employ-
ment.31 Employees are entitled to use the general skills and knowledge
acquired during their employment in competition with their former
employer.32 An employer must demonstrate ‘‘special circumstances’’ that
27See Reed, Roberts Assocs, Inc. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1976) (noting the
employer’s ‘‘legitimate interest . . . in safeguarding that which has made his business successful
and to protect himself against deliberate surreptitious commercial piracy.’’).
28See Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254, 259 (E.D. La. 1967) (‘‘[T]he
employee himself must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to change jobs without
abandoning the ability to practice his skills.’’).
29See Strauman, 353 N.E.2d at 593 (‘‘[O]ur economy is premised on the competition
engendered by the uninhibited flow of services, talent and ideas.’’).
30Blake, supra note 23, at 650.
31See, e.g., Club Aluminum Co. v. Young, 160 N.E. 804, 806 (Mass. 1928) (‘‘[A]n employer
cannot by contract prevent his employee from using the skill and intelligence acquired or
increased and improved through experience or through instruction received in the course of
the employment.’’).
32The Supreme Court of Illinois colorfully stated this policy as follows: ‘‘One who has worked
in a particular field cannot be compelled to erase from his mind all of the general skills,
knowledge and expertise acquired through his experience.’’ ILG Indus., Inc. v. Scott, 273
N.E.2d 393, 396 (Ill. 1971).
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make the agreement necessary to prevent some form of unfair competi-
tion.33
Traditionally, the courts recognized two primary interests as legit-
imate justifications for a noncompete agreement: the employer’s interests
in protecting the goodwill of the business and in protecting its trade
secrets.34 An employee noncompete agreement is often designed to
prevent an employee from taking advantage of the employer’s goodwill,
which the employee generated in his or her dealings with customers.35
Employees often develop personal relationships with their customers and
clients, but the goodwill so generated is a valuable asset of the business
because the employees are acting as agents at the time.36 Under the so-
called ‘‘customer contact’’ theory, the relational interests of the former
employer are protected.37
Protecting trade secrets is the second most common justification for
employee restrictive covenants. Unlike the goodwill interest, however, the
employer has an arsenal of legal weapons at its disposal to protect its trade
secrets. Past employees are under a continuing fiduciary duty not to
disclose or use trade secrets of their prior employers.38 Employers often
supplement that common law protection with nondisclosure and confi-
dentiality agreements specifying the proprietary business information that
is to remain confidential. Employers can obtain injunctive relief to prevent
the misappropriation of trade secrets or the imminent threat of such
33Whitmyer Brothers, Inc. v. Doyle, 274 A.2d 577, 582 (N.J. 1971) (quoting Vander Werf v.
Zunica Realty Co., 208 N.E.2d 74, 76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965)).
34Blake, supra note 23, at 653. See also Milton Handler & Daniel E. Lazoroff, Restraint of Trade
and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 669, 713–16 (1982).
35See Jordan Leibman & Richard Nathan, The Enforceability of Post-Employment Noncompetition
Agreements Formed After At-Will Employment Has Commenced: The ‘‘Afterthought Agreement,’’ 60 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1465, 1484–85 (1987).
36Blake, supra note 23, at 654–55.
37E.g., Lakeside Oil v. Slutsky, 98 N.W.2d 413, 415, 420 (Wis. 1959) (noting that the former
employee’s personal relationship with customers, whom the employee developed and served,
enabled the former employee to take away the customers).
38See, e.g., Omega Optical, Inc. v. Chroma Tech. Corp., 800 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Vt. 2002)
(noting the continuing duty of former employees not to disclose confidential information of
the employer).
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improper use or disclosure.39 Moreover, in recent years, courts have in-
creasingly protected trade secrets under the so-called inevitable disclosure
doctrine.40 Under this theory, a court can prevent an employee from
working for a competitor if the disclosure of trade secrets will be a virtual
certainty given the knowledge base of the former employee and the
position he or she has secured with the competitor.41
In the protection of trade secrets, noncompete agreements are used
as a means of minimizing the potential for trade secret misappropriation
by preventing an employee from working for a competitor or engaging in
a competing enterprise.42 Also, restrictive covenants have practical value in
that employers avoid the difficulties of proving an actual or threatened
misappropriation of trade secrets to secure an injunction.43 This further
allows employers to prevent any improper use of trade secrets before it
occurs rather than responding to a misappropriation, when the harm
(which may be significant) is done.44 Thus, employee noncompete agree-
ments are designed as a preventative measure, effectively limiting the
potential for trade secret disclosure or misappropriation by former employ-
ees.
If the employer establishes that a legitimate interest is served by an
agreement not to compete, the terms of the noncompete agreement are
examined to assure that it is no more extensive than necessary to serve that
interest. This assessment considers the reasonableness of (1) the time
period of the noncompete agreement,45 (2) the geographic area covered
39Unif. Trade Secret Act § 2 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 434 (1990). In addition, damages are
a potential remedy for trade secret misappropriation. Id. § 3.
40See infra Part VI.
41See, e.g., PepsiCo v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995).
42Blake, supra note 23, at 670.
43See, e.g., Comprehensive Techs. Int’l v. Software Artisans, 3 F.3d 730, 738–39 (finding no
trade secret misappropriation but enforcing the employee noncompete agreement because
secret information was at risk), vacated and appeal dismissed per stipulation, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 28601 (4th Cir. Sept. 30, 1993). See also Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High
Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 575, 597–600 (1999) (noting substantive and procedural limitations of protecting trade secrets
under trade secret law).
44Blake, supra note 23, at 669–70.
45In terms of time, courts tend to limit noncompete agreements to short durations, six months
to one year being quite common and ordinarily within the range of reasonableness. See, e.g.,
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by it,46 and (3) the business activities restricted by the covenant.47 Because
the scope of a noncompete agreement cannot be broader than reasonably
necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the employer, courts
applying the common law test are reluctant to allow noncompete agree-
ments that prevent an employee from working in any position for a
competitor or that prohibit an employee from engaging in a business that
is not directly competitive with the former employer’s business. In an oft-
cited opinion, the New York Court of Appeals upheld a noncompetition
agreement that prevented an oral surgeon from engaging in the practice of
oral surgery within a five-county area of New York, but it refused to
enforce that part of the noncompete agreement that would have prevented
the oral surgeon from practicing dentistry.48 The employer did not
practice dentistry and thus the former employee would not be directly
competing with him.49
Under the common law, courts were reluctant to partially enforce
unreasonable postemployment restrictions. An overbroad agreement was
either void per se50 or subject to severance under the ‘‘blue pencil’’
Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 545–46 (Wyo. 1993) (time to hire new
employee and give him or her reasonable opportunity to demonstrate effectiveness to
customers who dealt with prior employee).
46See, e.g., Standard Register Co. v. Kerrigan, 119 S.E.2d 533, 539 (S.C. 1961) (‘‘[T]he general
rule [is] that the territorial restraint in a covenant not to compete will, generally speaking, be
considered reasonable if the area covered by the restraint is limited to the territory in which
the employee was able, during the term of his employment, to establish contact with his
employer’s customers.’’). It has been observed, however, that ‘‘[m]ost confidential information
worthy of any protection at all is appropriately protectable without geographic limitation,
because once an employee has divulged a trade secret in any location the likelihood that it will
become public knowledge available to immediate competitors is greatly increased.’’ Blake,
supra note 23, at 679.
47The type of activities that the noncompete agreement prohibits the employee from
engaging in must be tied to the legitimate interests the employer is seeking to protect. See,
e.g., Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Lockhart, 5 F. Supp. 2d 667, 683–84 (S.D. Ind. 1998)
(finding the covenant overbroad because it limited former employee from working for
competitor in any capacity and precluded him from selling products that were not directly
competitive).
48Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 268 N.E.2d 751, 754–55 (1971).
49Id.
50Georgia continues to follow the rule that an overbroad employee noncompete agreement
cannot be severed under the ‘‘blue pencil’’ doctrine and such an agreement renders
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doctrine.51 Although the blue pencil doctrine allows courts to enforce
separate lawful covenants within a contract or to strike language where a
change is grammatically possible, it does not permit the courts to otherwise
modify the terms of an agreement.52 The common law approach is
supported by several policy arguments, the strongest being that to enforce
an overbroad agreement by changing its terms encourages employers to
draft onerous noncompete agreements to the potential detriment of
employees.53 A related concern is that the courts should not rewrite a
contract and impose it on an employee who did not voluntarily agree to
it.54
The probing examination of the terms of noncompete agreements
under the common law approach, a form of strict judicial scrutiny,55 is
reinforced by other rules that make it difficult to enforce postemployment
restraints. The validity issue is considered a question of law to be
determined by the courts, even though a consideration of the facts
surrounding an agreement not to compete is essential for a determination
of its enforceability.56 At the trial level, past employers who can demon-
strate the reasonableness of the restraint must also establish the prerequi-
sites for injunctive relief, particularly irreparable injury.57 On appeal,
unenforceable other noncompete or nonsolicitation covenants in the same agreement. E.g.,
Advanced Tech. Consultants, Inc. v. Roadtrac, L.L.C., 551 S.E.2d 735, 737 (Ga. App. 2001).
51See, e.g., Solari Indus. v. Malady, 264 A.2d 53, 55–57 (N.J. 1970) (discussing the void per se
rule and the blue pencil doctrine and allowing reformation of an overbroad noncompete
agreement to render it enforceable).
52See, e.g., Hartman v. W.H. Odell, 450 S.E.2d 912, 920 (N.C. App. 1994) (noting severe limits
on the court’s power to alter the contract under the blue pencil doctrine).
53Blake, supra note 23, at 682–83 (1960) (‘‘If severance is generally applied, employers can
fashion truly ominous covenants with confidence that they will be pared down and enforced
when the facts of a particular case are not unreasonable. This smacks of having one’s
employee’s cake, and eating it too.’’).
54See, e.g., E. Bus. Forms v. Kistler, 189 S.E.2d 22, 24 (S.C. 1972) (‘‘We cannot make a new
agreement for the parties into which they did not voluntarily enter.’’).
55See, e.g., Gary Van Zeeland Talent, Inc. v. Sandas, 267 N.W.2d 242, 246–51 (Wis. 1978)
(providing an in-depth review of the law regarding whether a customer list was a trade secret
entitled to legal protection).
56E.g., Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Walker, 307 S.E.2d 914, 916 (Ga. 1983).
57For a recent discussion of the irreparable injury requirement in the employee noncompete
agreement context, see the Alabama Supreme Court’s opinion in Ormco Corp. v. Johns, 869 So.
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courts consider the question de novo, without the traditional deference
accorded to trial court determinations on other issues.58 In effect, employ-
ee agreements not to compete come to the court with a heavy presumption
of invalidity. The burden is on the employer to justify the need for and the
reasonableness of the terms of the agreement.
III. RESTRICTIVE STATE STATUTES ON EMPLOYEE
NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS
Traditionally, state restraint of trade statutes either prohibited employee
agreements not to compete or severely restricted the circumstances under
which such agreements could be enforced. Some states, notably Califor-
nia59 and North Dakota,60 continue to adhere to such restrictive laws.
California’s noncompete statute, Section 16600 of the California Business
and Professions Code, which dates to 1872, provides that ‘‘every contract
by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade,
or business of any kind is to that extent void.’’61 This strong public policy
favoring employee mobility has been vigorously protected by the Califor-
nia courts. Section 16600 has been interpreted to preclude any agreement
that restricts an employee from working for a competitor of his former
employer or imposing a penalty for doing so.62
California has recognized a limited trade secret exception to Section
16600 under which a noncompete agreement is permitted when it is
necessary to protect a former employer’s customer lists. An agreement
preventing a former employee from using such confidential customer
2d 1109 (Ala. 2003). In a well-reasoned opinion, the Ormco court rejected the position of many
courts that irreparable injury can be inferred from a mere breach of the noncompete
agreement, opting instead for the position that only a rebuttable inference arises from such
a breach. Id. at 1114–19.
58E.g., Bernier v. Merrill Air Eng’rs, 770 A.2d 97, 103 (Me. 2001).
59CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1997).
60N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2006). See text accompanying infra notes 222–31 for a
discussion of the North Dakota Supreme Court’s most recent opinion strictly interpreting
Section 9-08-06.
61CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600.
62Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 398 P.2d 147, 149 (Cal. 1965).
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information to solicit business was enforced by the California Supreme
Court in Gordon v. Landau.63 The court reasoned that the agreement did
not prevent the former employee from competing in violation of Section
16600. It only prevented him from using his former employer’s valuable
trade secrets in competition.64 Despite this exception, agreements not to
compete in most employment settings are unenforceable in California.65
Regulatory statutes in other states limit the enforceability of employ-
ee noncompete agreements to a lesser extent than in California.66 Color-
ado, for example, refuses to enforce employee agreements not to compete
other than restrictive covenants of high-level employeesFexecutive and
management personnel and officers and employees who constitute profes-
sional staff to executive and management personnel.67 Consistent with the
state’s strong policy against covenants not to compete,68 this management
63321 P.2d 456 (Cal. 1958).
64Id. at 459.
65See, e.g., Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573, 577
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (finding unenforceable under Section 16600 a noncompete agreement
that prevented former employees from providing traffic reporting services for their former
employer’s customer, a radio station). The Metro Traffic court explained: ‘‘California courts
have consistently declared [Section 16600] an expression of public policy to ensure that every
citizen shall retain the right to pursue any lawful employment and enterprise of their choice.’’
Id.
66Some states have general employee noncompete statutes that impose limits on postemploy-
ment restraints. For example, Alabama law provides as follows:
One who . . . is employed as an agent, servant or employee may agree with his employer
to refrain from carrying on or engaging in a similar business and from soliciting old
customers of such employer within a specified county, city, or part thereof so long as the
. . . employer carries on a like business therein.
ALA. CODE § 8-1-1 (2002).
Other states have statutory provisions that address specific issues relating to employee
noncompete agreements. Oregon requires independent consideration in the form of a ‘‘bona
fide advancement’’ for a noncompete agreement entered after the commencement of
employment to be binding. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.295(1) (West Supp. 2006). Wisconsin
codifies the common law reasonableness test, but it prevents a court from reforming or blue
penciling an overbroad employee noncompete agreement. WIS. STAT. § 103.465 (2004).
67COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(2)(d) (West 2003).
68Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Sandvick, 732 F.2d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1984) (recognizing
the fundamental policy of Colorado disfavoring noncompete agreements in choice-of-law
analysis).
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personnel exception has been construed narrowly by the Colorado
courts.69 Thus, the exception has been limited to those who are in some
sense ‘‘in charge’’ of a business.70 Under this view, account executives and
other lower-level salespersons do not fall within the exception.71 Colorado
also allows agreements necessary to protect trade secrets, but this excep-
tion has been given a similarly narrow reading by the courts.72
IV. THE MODERN APPROACH TO EMPLOYEE
NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS
The traditional law of employee noncompete agreements was highly
protective of the employee’s interests in mobility and society’s interest in
free competition. Whether governed under the common law reasonable-
ness test or under state restraint of trade statutes, employers had a
demanding legal standard to meet in order to justify restrictions on
postemployment competition. Gradually, however, many jurisdictions
adopted less stringent approaches to such agreements. Some states
adopted statutory provisions that liberalized the common law rules, there-
by permitting employee noncompete agreements that would have been
deemed unreasonable under traditional common law standards. Com-
pared to the common law, this modern approach is more favorable to the
interests of employers and less protective of the employee’s interest in
mobility.
A. Broadening the Permissible Scope of Employee Noncompete Agreements
Under the modern approach, courts have relaxed the common law
reasonableness standard in terms of the permissible scope of employee
69See Gold Messenger, Inc. v. McGuay, 937 P.2d 907, 910 (Colo. App. 1997) (noting that
exceptions are narrowly construed because noncompete agreements are disfavored in
Colorado).
70Atmel Corp. v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 30 P.3d 789, 794 (Colo. App. 2001).
71Mgmt. Recruiters of Boulder, Inc. v. Miller, 762 P.2d 763, 765 (Colo. App. 1988).
72See, e.g., Colorado Accounting Machs., Inc. v. Mergenthaler, 609 P.2d 1125, 1126 (Colo. App.
1980) (‘‘Even if we assume, arguendo, that a narrowly drafted non-competition clause
specifically protecting trade secrets would be a valid exception under [the statute], here,
the sole purpose behind the restrictive covenant is to prohibit all competition.’’).
122 Vol. 45 / American Business Law Journal
noncompete agreements. Many courts employ a balancing-of-interests test
that is more deferential to employers despite their stated adherence to the
common law.73 Under the modern approach, restrictive covenants up to
five years have been permitted by some courts.74 Covenants that are
broader than necessary for the protection of the employer’s interests have
been upheld. Thus, for example, states taking a more relaxed approach
have allowed noncompetition restrictions that protect more than just the
customers with whom the employee had contacts.75 Similarly, a noncom-
pete covenant preventing an employee from working in businesses that do
not compete with the former employer’s business has been upheld.76
The development of employee noncompete law in Ohio illustrates
the shift from a strict common law reasonableness standard to the more
relaxed modern approach to covenants not to compete in the employment
context.77 In Ohio, the state courts initially followed a strict version of the
common law reasonableness test. Thus, in the leading case of Briggs v.
73See, e.g., Dobbins, DeGuire & Tucker v. Rutherford, 708 P.2d 577, 580 (Mont. 1985) (holding
that the covenant should afford reasonable protection forFand not impose an unreasonable
burden uponFthe employer, the employee, or the public); Vermont Elec. Supply Co. v.
Andrus, 315 A.2d 456, 458 (Vt. 1974) (mandating enforcement unless the agreement is
contrary to public policy, unnecessary for protection of the employer, or unnecessarily
restrictive of the employee’s rights, considering the nature of the contract and circumstances
of performance).
74See, e.g., Med. Educ. Assistance Corp. v. State, 19 S.W.3d 803, 816 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)
(enforcing a five-year noncompete agreement between a medical school and a faculty
physician, making special note of the important public interest in maintaining a viable
medical school in upper east Tennessee).
75See, e.g., UZ Eng’red Prods. Co. v. Midwest Motor Supply Co., 770 N.E.2d 1068, 1080–81
(Ohio Ct. App. 2001).
76See Roanoke Eng’g Sales Co. v. Rosenbaum, 290 S.E.2d 882, 885 (Va. 1982) (restriction on
working for ‘‘similar’’ business).
77Kentucky is another state in which the courts have moved from the common law reason-
ableness approach to a more permissive standard for employee noncompete agreements.
Compare Crowell v. Woodruff, 245 S.W.2d 447, 449 (Ky. App. 1951) (enforcing an employee
noncompete agreement ‘‘where the purpose is to prevent unfair competition by the employee
. . . and the restraint is no greater than reasonably necessary to secure the protection’’) with
Hammons v. Big Sandy Claims Svc., Inc., 567 S.W.2d 313, 315 (adopting the enforceability
standard first applied in the sale-of-business context that a noncompete agreement is
enforceable if ‘‘the restriction is such only as to afford fair protection to the interests of the
covenantee and is not so large as to interfere with the public interests or impose undue
hardship on the party restricted’’ (quoting Ceresia v. Mitchell, 242 S.W.2d 359, 364 (Ky.
1951))).
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Butler,78 the Ohio Supreme Court announced a rigorous, three-part
standard to judge the enforceability of employee noncompete agreements.
Postemployment restraints were enforceable only when: (1) the restriction
was not ‘‘beyond that reasonably necessary for the protection of the
employer in his business,’’ (2) ‘‘the provisions [were] not unreasonably
restrictive upon the rights of the employee,’’ and (3) the covenant did ‘‘not
contravene public policy.’’79
Cases subsequent to Briggs continued to follow the common law
approach. Thus, in Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter,80
the court rejected a dance studio’s covenant that attempted to prevent one
of its dance instructors from working for a competing dance studio.81 In a
tour de force exposition on the law of employee noncompete agreements,
the court first noted the heavy burden imposed on an employer to justify a
‘‘presumptively void’’ restrictive covenant.82 Such a restraint of trade
should be ‘‘cautiously considered, carefully scrutinized, looked upon with
disfavor, strictly interpreted and reluctantly upheld.’’83 Applying the
common law standards, the court concluded that Arthur Murray had
not carried its burden to demonstrate the necessity for the postemploy-
ment restraint, either under the ‘‘customer contact’’ or trade secret
theories.84 It found that the employee did not have the requisite ‘‘hold’’
over the dance studio’s customers and the training in the Arthur Murray
teaching methods was not a trade secret.85
Similarly, in Extine v. Williams Midwest, Inc.,86 the Ohio Supreme
Court followed the common law blue pencil rule in severing portions of an
overbroad noncompete agreement.87 Although the court noted a trend in
7845 N.E.2d 757 (1942).
79Id. at 763.
80105 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio C.P. Ct. 1952).
81Id. at 711–12.
82Id. at 693.
83Id.
84Id. at 705–11.
85Id. at 709.
86200 N.E.2d 297 (1964).
87Id. at 299–300.
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the law permitting reformation of overbroad restrictive covenants, it
adhered to the traditional rule, in part because it had implicitly approved
that rule in Briggs.88 However, Extine was overruled eleven years later in
the landmark case of Raimonde v. Van Vlerah,89 a case that began a more
permissive approach to employee noncompete agreements in the state. In
discarding the blue pencil doctrine and granting courts broad power to
modify noncompete agreements, the court signaled a new direction.90 Its
policy justifications in favor of the move to reformation reflected a pro-
employer view of postemployment restraints.91 Also, it rejected the argu-
ment that allowing courts to reform unreasonable noncompete agree-
ments would encourage employers to impose overbroad restraints on
employees.92 Thus, both the tenor and result of the court’s opinion
deviated from the common law suspicion of restraints of trade in the
employment context.
The Raimonde court’s more relaxed approach to postemployment
restraint agreements was substantially reinforced by the court’s subsequent
opinion in Rogers v. Runfola & Associates, Inc.93 In Raimonde, the court had
announced a list of factors to consider in determining the reasonable scope
of an employee noncompete agreement.94 In Runfola, the court in effect
created a balancing-of-interest standard for employee noncompete agree-
88Id. at 298–99.
89325 N.E.2d 544 (Ohio 1975).
90Id. at 546.
91Id. (‘‘Because employers seek to ensure that provisions are not unreasonable, and therefore
severed, employees may gain the benefit of overly-lenient employment restrictions.’’).
92Id. at 547 (‘‘Most employers who enter contracts do so in good faith, and seek only to protect
legitimate interests. In fact, relatively few employment contracts reach the courts.’’).
93565 N.E.2d 540 (Ohio 1991).
94The Raimonde court stated:
Among the factors properly to be considered are: ‘‘[t]he absence or presence of
limitations as to time and space, . . . whether the employee represents the sole contact
with the customer; whether the employee is possessed with confidential information or
trade secrets; whether the covenant seeks to eliminate competition which would
be unfair to the employer or merely seeks to eliminate ordinary competition; whether
the covenant seeks to stifle the inherent skill and experience of the employee; whether
the benefit to the employer is disproportional to the detriment to the employee; whether
the covenant operates as a bar to the employee’s sole means of support; whether the
employee’s talent which the employer seeks to suppress was actually developed during
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ments,95 one that relies heavily on the ‘‘Raimonde factors’’ as they have
become known in Ohio.96
Runfola involved a two-year noncompete agreement executed by two
former employees of Runfola & Associates, a court reporting service. The
employees, who had attended school to become court reporters, were
prohibited from engaging in court reporting services within Franklin
County, in which Columbus is located. The agreement also contained an
antisolicitation and antipiracy provision that had no time limit. After
leaving the firm, the employees sought and secured a declaratory judg-
ment that their noncompete agreements were unenforceable and then
commenced a court reporting service within the county.97
The Ohio Supreme Court found the noncompete agreements to be
unreasonable, both temporally and geographically, particularly in light of
the unique nature of court reporting services.98 Nevertheless, the court
enforced the agreement for one year, prohibiting both competition and
solicitation of Runfola’s clients within Columbus.99 In doing so, the court
found that Runfola & Associates had a legitimate business justification for
the noncompete agreements in the general training it provided the court
reporters.100
No doubt any employer can argue that it helped develop the talent
of an employee by providing valuable experiences in the field. But under
the common law reasonableness standard, this type of generalized skill and
training is not ordinarily considered sufficient to justify a postemployment
the period of employment; and whether the forbidden employment is merely incidental
to the main employment.’’
Raimonde, 325 N.E.2d at 547 (quoting Extine, 200 N.E.2d at 406).
95Runfola, 565 N.E.2d at 543.
96See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Stoneham, 747 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ohio App. 2000) (listing
factors and referring to them as the ‘‘Raimonde factors’’).
97Runfola, 565 N.E.2d at 541–42.
98Id. at 544.
99Id.
100Id. (‘‘Runfola played a large role in [the employees’] development as successful court
reporters. While employed by Runfola, Rogers and Marrone gained valuable experience in
the business . . . Much of this training and support, undoubtedly, inured to the benefit of the
[employees].’’).
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restraint.101 Although extraordinary training provided by employers
has been deemed sufficient by some courts,102 in Runfola it was the
employees themselves who secured the specialized education and
training necessary to practice court reporting.103 Thus, Runfola
expands the business interests that employers can protect under covenants
not to compete and thereby broadens the permissible scope of such
agreements. The combined effect of Raimonde and Runfola is to signifi-
cantly liberalize the law of employee noncompete agreements in Ohio.
Under the multifactor balancing-of-interests standard that has been
adopted in the state, broad employee noncompete agreements are
enforceable.104
B. Expanding the Interests Protectable under Employee Noncompete Agreements
Under the modern approach, many jurisdictions also have liberalized
the common law standards by broadening the interests that legitimately
can be protected by employee noncompete agreements. Some courts
have indicated that the employer’s informational interest extends beyond
the trade secret category to other business information.105 Thus, in
Ingersoll-Rand v. Ciavatti106 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that an
employer has a legitimate interest in protecting ‘‘highly specialized,
current information not generally known in the industry, created and
stimulated by the research environment furnished by the employer, to
which the employee has been ‘exposed’ and ‘enriched’ solely due to his
101Blake, supra note 23, at 652 (‘‘It has been uniformly held that general knowledge, skill or
facility acquired through training or experience while working for an employer appertain
exclusively to the employee. The fact that they were acquired or developed during the
employment does not, by itself, give the employer a sufficient interest to support a restraining
covenant. . . . ’’). See also supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
102See infra notes 109–11 and accompanying text.
103565 N.E.2d at 544.
104See, e.g., UZ Eng’red Prods. Co. v. Midwest Motor Supply Co., 770 N.E.2d 1068, 1081
(Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (upholding a noncompete agreement that protected the entire existing
and potential customer base of the former employer).
105E.g., L.M. Saliterman and Assocs. v. Finney, 361 N.W.2d 175, 178 (Minn. App. 1985) (citing
Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., 278 N.W.2d 81, 92 (Minn. 1979) (holding that an
injunction may be appropriate to protect confidential information even if the information is
not a trade secret).
106542 A.2d 879 (N.J. 1988).
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employment.’’107 The Ciavatti court carefully limited this business interest
to a narrow category of research-and-development (R&D)Fgenerated
information, which one could arguably claim is protected under trade
secret law.108 To that extent, Ciavatti’s outcome does not run contrary to
well-settled employee noncompete law. However, the extension to business
information that is not protected under trade secret law is inconsistent
with the principle that an employer has no legitimate interest in preventing
a past employee from using his or her general skills and knowledge in
competition. Moreover, because noncompete agreements are justified
as a preventative measure in the trade secret context, it is difficult to
argue that a noncompete agreement is necessary to protect information
that is either not secret or that does not give the firm a competitive
advantage in the market. An employee using such information is certainly
engaged in competitive activity, but not in the type of unfair competition
that noncompete agreements are designed to prevent. Nevertheless,
modern decisions like Ciavatti, if not carefully circumscribed by the
courts, have the potential to significantly expand the circumstances under
which an employer can conceivably justify an employee noncompete
agreement.
A similar expansion has occurred in the area of employee education
and training. Traditionally, courts recognized a legitimate interest in
employee education costs that are extraordinary or involve specialized
training.109 The idea underlying the extraordinary training interest is that
if an employer has expended substantial resources to provide an employee
with some unique skills, then it would be unfair for that employee to use
those skills to compete with his former employer.110 A less restrictive
alternative to the employer’s interest in employee training expenses is
the approach adopted in Colorado. By statute, Colorado law allows a
107Id. at 894.
108Id.
109See, e.g., Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1982) (commenting that ‘‘an
extraordinary investment in the training or education of the employee’’ is a protectable
interest); Voorhees v. Guyan Mach. Co., 446 S.E.2d 672, 677 (W. Va. 1994).
110Hapney v. Cent. Garage, Inc., 579 So. 2d 127, 132 (Fla. App. 1991) (‘‘The rationale is that if
an employer dedicates time and money to the extraordinary training and education of an
employee, whereby the employee attains a unique skill or an enhanced degree of sophistica-
tion in an existing skill, then it is unfair to permit that employee to use those skills to the
benefit of a competitor when the employee has contracted not to do so.’’).
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contractual provision for the recovery of the expense of educating and
training an employee who has served an employer for a period of less than
two years.111
Despite these limitations and alternatives, some courts have ex-
panded this interest to include generalized training, enforcing employee
noncompete agreements where the employee has acquired no unique or
specialized skills.112 Thus, in Borg-Warner Protective Services, Corp. v. Guards-
mark, Inc.,113 the court enforced a noncompete agreement as it applied to
security guards who were hired away by a rival private security firm (Borg-
Warner). In upholding the covenant, the court did not rely on any
employer interest in trade secrets or goodwill, because the security guards
were not privy to any trade secrets nor did they have any close relation-
ships with any of Guardsmark’s customers.114 The court concluded that
Guardsmark had a legitimate interest in its investment in the guards,
noting the two-week, on-the-job training and their education in the
‘‘culture of the client’s firm and the client’s own security personnel.’’115
Although the court may have been able to reconcile its decision with the
traditional common law approach,116 it chose to take an expansive view of
the interests protectable under employee noncompete agreements. Re-
cognizing investment in generalized employee training as a legitimate
interest is a clear departure from the common law, one that substantially
broadens the situations under which employee noncompete agreements
will be enforced.
111COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(2)(c) (West 2003). For an insightful discussion of training
repayment agreements, see generally Brandon S. Long, Note, Protecting Employer Investment in
Training: Noncompetes vs. Repayment Agreements, 54 DUKE L.J. 1295 (2005).
112See, e.g., Rogers v. Runfola & Assocs., Inc., 565 N.E.2d 540 (Ohio 1991). See supra notes 93–
104 and accompanying text (discussing Runfola case).
113946 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Ky. 1996).
114Id. at 501 (noting that the common law would not enforce covenants against employees
whose services were not unique (absent trade secrets or customer relationships), but reasoning
that ‘‘the more modern cases, including those in Kentucky, place more emphasis on the
employer’s investment in the employee and have evolved an approach balancing the
importance of that factor against the hardship to the employee and the public interest’’).
115Id. at 502.
116It could be argued that the employees received a form of specialized training because they
learned the unique security features of the client’s security system.
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C. The Movement From the Blue Pencil Doctrine to Reformation
Many states also grant the courts broad power to modify or change the
terms of an overbroad employee noncompete agreement so as to render the
agreement enforceable.117 Although some states continue to reject partial
enforcement of any kind118 or limit the courts’ power to rewrite the terms of
a restrictive covenant based on common law contract principles,119 there has
been a clear shift from the blue pencil doctrine to reformation.120 Reforma-
tion allows the courts to modify an agreement not to compete (even if the
agreement is not divisible into separate covenants) and to enforce the
agreement as reformed.121 Proponents of reformation have criticized
the common law approach as being too ‘‘mechanical,’’ placing undue
emphasis on whether covenants are separate and thereby glorifying form
over substance.122 A related argument is that reformation allows the courts
the discretion to fashion reasonable terms that are consistent with the general
intent of the parties to enter into a binding noncompete agreement.123 The
policy concern about overreaching by employers is resolved by refusing
to permit reformation where employers have deliberately drafted unreason-
117This is considered the majority rule. Data Mgmt., Inc. v. Greene, 757 P.2d 62, 64 (Alaska
1988). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184 (1981) (adopting the rule of
reformation).
118By statute, Wisconsin voids any overbroad agreement not to compete. WIS. STAT. § 103.465
(2004).
119E.g., Hartman v. Odell & Assocs., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 912, 920 (N.C. App. 1994) (holding that
the court cannot erase and replace offending terms of a noncompete agreement); E. Bus.
Forms, Inc. v. Kistler, 189 S.E.2d 22, 24 (S.C. 1972) (‘‘We must uphold the covenant as written
or not at all, it must stand or fall integrally.’’).
120State statutes in Florida, Michigan, and Texas specifically empower courts to reform
unreasonable employee agreements not to compete. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335(1)(c) (West
2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.774a (West 2002); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51(c)
(Vernon 2002).
121See, e.g., BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1226–27 (N.Y. 1999) (endorsing the
reformation approach by enforcing only part of a single, nondivisible paragraph of the
covenant).
122See, e.g., Data Mgmt., 757 P.2d at 64.
123See, e.g., Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 325 N.E.2d 544, 547 (Ohio 1975) (‘‘It permits courts to
fashion a contract reasonable between the parties, in accord with their intention at the time of
contracting, and enables them to evaluate all the factors comprising ‘reasonableness’ in the
context of employee covenants.’’).
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able provisions.124 A court may refuse to reform an overbroad noncom-
petition agreement if it finds that the employer did not act in good faith;125
however, there are a few cases in which the courts have invalidated a
noncompete agreement on this basis, because the good faith standard is ill
defined and ‘‘bad faith’’ is a difficult standard to prove.126
D. Liberalizing the Interpretation of Restrictive Restraint of Trade Statutes
Several jurisdictions have broadened the permissible scope of employee
noncompete agreements by reinterpreting seemingly restrictive restraint of
trade statutes to allow noncompete agreements that would otherwise be
invalidated under the traditional reading of the statutory language. Oklaho-
ma and Montana both adopted the same restraint of trade statute that exists
in California and North Dakota.127 Originally, courts in both states adopted an
interpretation consistent with California’s, which prohibited agreements that
directly or indirectly restrict an employee’s right to exercise a lawful trade,
business, or profession.128 Nevertheless, both jurisdictions subsequently
adopted a more permissive approach to employee noncompete agreements,
abandoning the California approach for one that permits postemployment
restrictions under a common law reasonableness formulation.129
In J.T. Miller Co. v. Madel,130 the Montana Supreme Court invalidated
a noncompete agreement that prohibited a former field agent of a life
124See, e.g., Cent. Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 37 (Tenn. 1984) (‘‘If
there is credible evidence to sustain a finding that a contract is deliberately unreasonable and
oppressive, then the covenant is invalid.’’).
125See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184 (1), (2) (1981) (reformation permitted ‘‘if
party who seeks to enforce the term obtained it in good faith and in accordance with
reasonable standards of fair dealing’’).
126But see, e.g., Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 406 A.2d 1310, 1313–14 (N.H. 1979)
(finding a lack of good faith because the noncompete covenants were not discussed during
negotiations and employees did not have a full understanding of the restrictions).
127Compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 (2005); OKLA. STAT. tit. 79, § 217 (2007) with CAL. BUS.
& PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2006).
128J.T Miller Co. v. Madel, 575 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Mont. 1978); E.S. Miller Labs., Inc. v. Griffin,
194 P.2d 877, 1879 (Okla. 1948).
129Dobbins, DeGuire & Tucker, P.C. v. Rutherford, MacDonald & Olson, 708 P.2d 577, 580
(Mont. 1985); Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pickard, 780 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Okla. 1989).
130575 P.2d 1321 (Mont. 1978).
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insurance company from engaging in the sale of insurance for five
years.131 Relying on the California interpretation of the statutory lan-
guage,132 the Madel court rejected the argument advanced by the employ-
er that the prohibition on trade restraints was not absolute but rather
permitted reasonable covenants not to compete.133 Consequently, the
employee was free to compete and use his general experience and
knowledge in competition.134 The restraint of trade statute prohibited
any agreement that restricted that right.135
But, in 1985, the Montana Supreme Court reinterpreted the statute
and created a permissive balancing test to judge the enforceability of
employee noncompete agreements. In Dobbins, DeGuire & Tucker, P.C. v.
Rutherford, MacDonald & Olson,136 the noncompete agreement required
the employee, an accountant, to make substantial payments to his former
employer in the event that the accountant left his position and continued to
work with prior firm clients.137 Instead of following Madel, the court in
Dobbins distinguished the facts in Madel from those in Dobbins. While
in Madel the noncompete directly restricted the employee’s right to engage
in a competing business, in Dobbins the noncompete did so only indirectly
by imposing an economic sanction for any breach of its terms.138 Using
that factual distinction, the Dobbins court effectively changed the settled
interpretation of the statute, reasoning that the law’s prohibitory language
was limited to situations where there was an absolute prohibition on an
employee’s right to engage in a profession.139
The court concluded that, in the absence of such a complete restraint,
the statute did not necessarily invalidate a noncompete agreement in an
employment setting. It adopted a three-part test to determine the validity
131Id. at 1322.
132Id.
133Id. at 1323.
134Id. at 1323–24.
135Id. at 1323.
136708 P.2d 577 (Mont. 1985).
137Id. at 578.
138Id. at 579.
139Id.
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of employee noncompete agreements.140 The test is permissive in that it
requires courts to balance ‘‘the competing interests of the public as well as
the employer and employee.’’141 Madel was effectively (but silently) over-
ruled.
E. The Adoption of Permissive State Statutes
A number of jurisdictions have adopted employee noncompete statutes
that expand the circumstances under which noncompete agreements
would be allowed under the common law reasonableness approach142 or
that liberalize the rules under existing restraint of trade statutes.143 One of
140Id. at 580 (‘‘(1)The covenant should be limited in operation either as to time or place; (2)
the covenant should be based in some good consideration; and (3) the covenant should afford
a reasonable protection for and not impose an unreasonable burden upon the employer, the
employee or the public.’’).
141Id.
142See, e.g., Am. Rim & Brake, Inc. v. Zoellner, 382 N.W.2d 421, 424 (S.D. 1986) (finding
noncompete agreements permissible under statute without requiring an independent show-
ing of reasonableness).
143Michigan also adopted a liberalizing statute in 1985, the Michigan Antitrust Reform Act
(MARA). MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.774a (2002). Prior to the passage of MARA, Michigan law
prohibited almost every form of employee agreement not to compete. See Frank T. Mamat, An
Overview of Employment Agreements-Covenants Not to Compete and Arbitration Agreements, 76 MICH.
B.J. 1090, 1090 (1997). MARA parallels the common law reasonableness approach to employee
noncompete agreements. For a discussion of the history of noncompete law in Michigan, see
Bristol Window and Door, Inc. v. Hoogenstyn, 650 N.W.2d 670, 674–80 (Mich. App. 2002).
With the passage of the Texas Covenants Not to Compete Act, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§§ 15.50–52 (Vernon 2002), Texas is another state that attempted by statute to liberalize the rules
relating to employee agreements not to compete. However, the Act has been given a narrow
interpretation by the Texas Supreme Court. In Light v. Centel Cellular Co., 883 S.W.2d 642, 647
(Tex. 1994), the court held that a noncompete covenant can be based on an at-will relationship
only if a twofold consideration requirement is met. First, the consideration given by the employer
in the agreement must give rise to the employer’s interest in restraining the employee from
competing. Id. at 647 n.14. Second, the restrictive covenant must be designed to enforce the
employee’s consideration or return promise in the agreement. Id. Thus, if an employee is given
proprietary business information, agrees not to disclose that information, and signs an agreement
not to compete, the restrictive covenant is ancillary to that nondisclosure agreement. If, on the
other hand, an at-will employee who has already been given access to trade secrets is requested to
sign a restrictive covenant, it is probably not ancillary to any otherwise enforceable agreement. In
its most recent decision, Alex Sheshunoff Management Services v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644 (Tex.
2006), the Texas Supreme Court did not abandon the test under Light, but the court allowed an
employer’s promise of future performance (such as a promise to provide the employee with
conﬁdential information), to be sufﬁcient consideration for a covenant not to compete. Id. at 662.
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the most extreme examples is the Florida restrictive covenants law passed
in 1996.144 The statute contains a nonexclusive laundry list of protectable
interests, which not only includes the traditional interests in trade secrets
and customer relationships, but also extends to interests in an ongoing
business or professional practice, professional information that otherwise
does not qualify as trade secrets, relationships with prospective customers,
and extraordinary specialized training.145 Although the courts must
consider the reasonableness of the noncompete covenant in terms of
scope, the statute conflicts with the common law approach in other
respects. First, rather than giving restrictive covenants a strict construction,
covenants are to be construed in favor of providing reasonable protection
to all legitimate business interests of the employer.146 Second, once the
employer establishes a legitimate business interest to be served by the
covenant, the burden shifts to the employee to demonstrate the unreason-
ableness of the agreement, a reversal of the burden imposed under the
common law.147 Finally, courts are specifically empowered to grant any
appropriate and effective remedy, including to award attorney fees to the
prevailing party and to reform an overbroad noncompete agreement.148 It
is fair to say that the statute adopts an approach to employee noncompete
agreements that is extremely favorable to business interests in the state,
one that runs counter to the common law reasonableness test.149
F. Summary
Considered in isolation, the modern changes to the law of employee
noncompete agreements could be viewed as minor deviations from the
The Texas legislature’s attempt to liberalize the law of employee noncompete agreements has only
been partially successful.
144FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335 (West 2002).
145Id. § 542.335(1)(b).
146Id. § (1)(h).
147Id. § (1)(c).
148Id. § (1)(j).
149See, e.g., Balasco v. Gulf Auto Holding, 707 So. 2d 858, 860 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding
a nonpiracy agreement in an automobile salesperson’s contract and recognizing a legitimate
interest in ‘‘promoting productivity and maintaining a competent and specialized sales
team’’).
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traditional approach to the enforceability of postemployment restraints.
Taken together, however, these changes have substantially altered the legal
landscape for employees bound by covenants not to compete. The modern
approach represents a liberalization of both the common law and statutory
rules relating to employee noncompete agreements. Employers can more
easily justify and enforce such agreements under the modern approach. In
addition, employers have discretion to impose broad, standardized non-
compete agreements on employees, knowing that the courts will generally
reform their agreements if they are deemed unreasonable. Coupled with
these changes are other tools to prevent competition by former employees,
including the threat of suits for intentional interference with contracts
against employers hiring employees subject to noncompete covenants.150
While the balance of competing interests at common law was tilted toward
the employee’s interests in mobility, and society’s interests in free competi-
tion, the modern approach shifts the balance toward the employer’s
interests in protecting its property and forestalling competition by former
employees.
V. THE EMERGING LAW: HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY OF
EMPLOYEE NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS
An analysis of the most recent court opinions on employee noncompete
agreements reveals a new trend. Our review of significant state supreme
court decisions from 1999 to 2006 and other legal developments related to
the law of employee noncompete agreements indicates a heightened
judicial scrutiny of employee noncompete agreements. This new trend is
clearly a retreat from the permissive modern approach and a movement
back to the restrictive doctrines of the common law.
A. Limiting the Business Interests Protectable Under Noncompete Covenants
One facet of the recent trend can be seen in the courts’ approach to the
threshold issue of a protectable interest. Courts in recent opinions have
carefully limited the types of business interests that can justify the imposi-
150See, e.g., Kallok v. Medtronic, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 356, 361–62 (Minn. 1998) (recognizing a
cause of action for tortious interference with a valid employment noncompete agreement).
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tion of postemployment restraints.151 By narrowly defining the interests
protectable under employee noncompete agreements, the most recent
opinions reject the expansion of such interests under the modern
approach.
The New York Court of Appeals, in BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg,152
clarified the extent to which the employer’s interest in goodwill could
justify a noncompete agreement. The Court of Appeals had traditionally
recognized an interest in customer relationships, protecting employers
from competition by former employees whose skills or services were
unique or extraordinary.153 Members of medical and other professions
generally had been considered to provide unique or extraordinary services
and were potentially subject to broader restrictions than other employ-
ees.154
In BDO Seidman, the Court of Appeals declined to extend that
general rule to all professional employees.155 The case involved a manager
of BDO Seidman, a public accounting firm. Jeffrey Hirshberg worked for
BDO Seidman for five years when he was promoted to the level of
manager, a step below partner. As a condition of the advancement, he
signed a manager agreement that contained a provision requiring him to
pay liquidated damages if he served any former client of BDO within
eighteen months of his termination. He later left the firm and allegedly
served some of BDO’s clients in breach of the manager contract.156
On appeal, the Court of Appeals conceded that accounting has all of
the characteristics of a learned profession, but it refused to follow the
learned profession cases.157 Instead, the court concluded that Hirshberg’s
151E.g., Nat’l Employment Serv. Corp. v. Olsten Staffing Serv., Inc., 761 A.2d 401, 405 (N.H.
2000) (costs associated with recruiting and hiring employees are not a legitimate interest for
an employee noncompete agreement).
152712 N.E.2d 1220 (N.Y. 1999).
153Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y 1976).
154See, e.g., Lumex v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624, 633 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Strauman, 353 N.E.2d
at 593 (noting the application of unique or extraordinary skills or services standard to
members of the learned professions).
155712 N.E.2d at 1226.
156Id. at 1221.
157Id. at 1223–24 (noting accountancy ‘‘has all the earmarks of a learned profession,’’
including the ‘‘extensive formal training and education’’ of CPAs, the requirement that CPAs
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status in the firm was not based upon the uniqueness or extraordinary
nature of the accounting services he generally performed on behalf of
the firm, but mostly on his ability to attract a corporate clientele.158 As a
result, the court carefully scrutinized the legitimacy of any interest claimed
by BDO under the common law standard.159 BDO contended that it was
entitled to protect its entire client base because a modern accounting
firm spends considerable resources to build and maintain that base.160
The court found only an interest in protecting the client base from
unfair competition. Unless a former employee uses confidential infor-
mation to obtain clients, the employer’s interest is limited to the client
relationships that the employer enabled the employee to acquire in the
performance of his work. The noncompete agreement was fatally
overbroad to the extent that it applied to clients with whom Hirshberg
had no significant relationship while at BDO as well as clients who
employed BDO as a result of Hirshberg’s independent recruitment
efforts.161
BDO Seidman circumscribes the legitimate interests that an employer
can claim to justify a noncompete agreement, tying the goodwill interest to
client and customer relationships acquired by the employee in the course of
his employment. The court also limited the application of prior opinions
that suggested that all professional employees would be characterized as
having unique or extraordinary skills. After BDO Seidman, that category of
employee will be limited to employees whose peculiar skills give them a
unique competitive advantage over their former employer.
B. Restricting the Scope of Employee Noncompete Agreements and Limiting the
Power of Reformation
Another aspect of the trend of recent opinions heightening the judicial
scrutiny of employee noncompete agreements has been the adoption of
pass a written examination, CPAs’ continuing education requirements, the oversight of a
professional standards board governed by statutory disciplinary procedures, and the ex-
istence of a national code of professional conduct).
158Id. at 1224.
159Id. at 1224–26.
160Id. at 1224.
161Id. at 1225.
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rules narrowing the enforceable scope of such agreements.162 Comple-
menting these restrictive doctrines has been a shift in judicial thinking
regarding the modern rule permitting the reformation of an overbroad
noncompete covenant. The trend has been to limit the courts’ power to
reform the parties’ agreement, either by following the traditional blue
pencil doctrine or by placing significant limits on the reformation power.
We discuss examples of each below. As a result of these developments, the
permissible scope of noncompete agreements has been substantially
curtailed in recent opinions.
In a landmark opinion, the Arizona Supreme Court held in Valley
Medical Specialists v. Farber163 that a noncompete clause under a share-
holder/employment agreement, which restricted a physician’s medical
162In Mertz v. Pharmacists Mut. Ins. Co., 625 N.W.2d 197, 204–06 (Neb. 2001), the Nebraska
Supreme Court invalidated an employee noncompete agreement that prohibited a former
employee from soliciting pharmacists in the entire state of Nebraska regardless of the
pharmacists’ relationship to the employer or former employee. In doing so, the Mertz court
clarified an apparent conflict in its prior opinions on the permissable scope of employee
noncompete agreements. In Polly v. Ray D. Hilderman & Co., 407 N.W.2d 751, 756 (Neb. 1987),
the Nebraska Supreme Court had announced as a general rule that a covenant not to compete
in an employment contract may be valid only if it restricts the former employee from soliciting
the former employer’s clients or accounts with whom the former employee actually did
business and had personal contact. But in a prior opinion, Dana F. Cole & Co. v. Byerly, 320
N.W.2d 916, 918 (Neb. 1982), the court had approved a restrictive covenant preventing a
manager of an accounting firm from doing accounting work within seventy-five miles of the
branch office he managed. The Mertz court explicitly overruled Dana F. Cole and thereby
restricted the permissible breadth of employee noncompete agreements. Mertz, 625 N.W. 2d
at 205.
In a surprising series of recent opinions, the Virginia Supreme Court, which had embraced
the modern approach, adopted restrictive standards for employee noncompete agreements.
Virginia had allowed covenants restricting employees from directly or indirectly engaging in
any employment or competition with their former employer, in the same or a similar business.
See, e.g., Roanoke Eng’g Sales Co. v. Rosenbaum, 290 S.E.2d 882, 885 (Va. 1982). As with
other courts embracing the modern approach, Virginia court opinions tended to defer to the
interests of employers and minimize the hardship on employees and the negative implications
of such agreements on the public interest. See, e.g., Paramount Termite Control Co. v. Rector,
380 S.E.2d 922, 925 (Va. 1989).
However, the recent Virginia Supreme Court decisions depart from the modern approach
by requiring a closer connection between the language of the noncompete agreement and the
asserted interests of the employer. See Omniplex World Servs., Corp. v. U.S. Investigative
Servs., Inc., 618 S.E.2d 340, 343 (Va. 2005); Modern Environments, Inc. v. Stinnett, 561
S.E.2d 694, 495–96 (Va. 2002); Simmons v. Miller, 544 S.E.2d 666, 678 (Va. 2001); Motion
Control Sys., Inc. v. East, 546 S.E.2d 424, 426 (Va. 2001).
163982 P.2d 1277 (Ariz. 1999).
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practice, was unreasonably overbroad.164 Although prior to Valley Medical
Specialists an Arizona appeals court had approved a similar restrictive
covenant,165 in Valley Medical Specialists, the court adopted a more restric-
tive approach. The court also made several important pronouncements
regarding the enforceability of employee noncompete agreements, both in
general and specifically in the medical context.
Valley Medical Specialists (VMS), a professional corporation, hired
Steven Farber, a pulmonologist, in 1985. He later became a shareholder,
officer, and director of the firm.166 In 1991, Dr. Farber and the other VMS
directors executed a stock and employment agreement that prohibited Dr.
Farber from competing in the practice of medicine within five miles of any
VMS office for three years.167 VMS sought to enforce the restrictive
covenant when Dr. Farber left the firm and began practicing in violation
of the agreement.168
Initially, the court had to resolve the threshold issue of the level of
judicial scrutiny, which determined whether the agreement was subject to
the more relaxed test applied in the sale-of-business context or to the
demanding standard applied to employee noncompete agreements.169
The court determined that the shareholder agreement was more analo-
gous to an employee noncompete agreement, in part because the primary
concern of the law in protecting the goodwill purchased by a buyer of a
business is not implicated when a professional partnership is split up. The
court found strong public policy concerns in restricting a physician’s
practice, relying on the American Medical Association’s policy of
discouraging such agreements.170 It stopped short of declaring such
noncompete agreements void per se,171 the position adopted by the trial
164Id. at 1285.
165Phoenix Orthopaedic Surgeons, Ltd. v. Peairs, 790 P.2d 752 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).
166Valley Medical Specialists, 982 P.2d at 1278–79.
167Id. at 1279.
168Id. at 1279–80.
169Id. at 1281–83.
170Id. at 1282.
171Id. at 1283 n.1. This is the position adopted by the recent Tennessee Supreme Court
opinion in Murfreesboro Medical Clinic, P.A. v. Udom, 166 S.W.3d 674, 682 (Tenn. 2005).
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court172; however, it embraced a strict level of judicial scrutiny in light of
the important public policy interests at stake.173
The court found that any goodwill interest of VMS in its patients was
lessened because of the personal and professional nature of the physician–
patient relationship and the patient’s strong interest in freedom of
choice.174 Despite the lack of any strong goodwill interest in its patients,
the court recognized VMS’s interest in its referral services (protecting
referrals from existing patients). But this referral service interest was
obviously relatively weak in comparison to VMS’s interest in its patients.175
This, in turn, limited the permissible scope of the noncompete agree-
ment.176
In terms of the breadth of the noncompete agreement, the court
found six months sufficient for VMS to find a replacement.177 The court
also rejected the position of the court of appeals that public policy interests
in preserving the physician–patient relationship were not adversely
affected by the agreement:178 Finally, it rejected the approach of the
appeals court, which had reformed the noncompete agreement. Although
the Arizona courts follow the blue pencil doctrine, the lower court went too
far by rewriting its terms. The court reiterated its adherence to the blue
pencil doctrine. Nevertheless, it noted that even the blue pencil doctrine
has potentially in terrorem effects on employees and, thus, it refused to allow
broader reformation powers than under the common law approach.179
Valley Medical Specialists is significant in several respects. First, it
applied principles of employee noncompete law in a new context: a
restrictive covenant signed by an employee who also was an owner of
the business. Arguments could be made that such an extension is un-
172Valley Medical Specialties, 982 P.2d at 1281–82.
173Id. at 1283.
174Id.
175Id. at 1284.
176Id. at 1284–85.
177Id.
178Id. at 1285 (‘‘Even if we assume other pulmonologists will be available to cover Dr. Farber’s
patients within the restricted area, we disagree with this view. It ignores the significant
interests of individual patients within the restricted area.’’).
179Id. at 1286.
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warranted and that the law’s concerns with protecting employees from
unreasonable noncompete agreements are not implicated in the partner-
ship context,180 but the court rejected those arguments.181 Second, the
court’s approach to the scope of the agreement was quite restrictive. It
accepted the rule that the permissible length of a noncompete is deter-
mined by the time necessary for a business to have a replacement
employee. It found six months reasonable in a highly specialized field of
medicine,182 which suggests that, in other less sophisticated fields, the time
frame should be equally as limited.183 It also embraced the approach that a
restrictive covenant is overly broad if it restricts an employee from
engaging in activities unrelated to the prior employment. Finally, it limited
the power of courts to reform an overbroad noncompete agreement under
the blue pencil doctrine, preferring to continue with the more restrictive
common law rule.184
In 2005, the Idaho Supreme Court rendered a significant opinion on
the permissible scope of an employee noncompete agreement, in Freiburger
v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc.185 Stephen Freiburger, an engineer and high-level
manager with J-U-B Engineers, one of Idaho’s largest engineering firms,
signed a noncompete agreement at the time of his initial hire in 1991.
Under it, Freiburger promised not to ‘‘take’’ any of J-U-B’s past or present
clients, projects, or pending clients or projects for a period of two years
after termination.186 In 2001, he left J-U-B and went to work for another
engineering firm, Riedesel Engineering. Then, in an action Freiburger
180For an excellent discussion of noncompete agreements in the professional context,
see Serena L. Kafker, Golden Handcuffs: Enforceability of Non-Competition Clauses in
Professional Partnership Agreements of Accountants, Physicians, and Attorneys, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 31
(1993).
181Valley Medical Specialists, 982 P.2d at 1281.
182Id. at 1284–85.
183See, e.g., Bed Mart, Inc. v. Kelley, 45 P.3d 1219, 1223 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding a
six-month noncompete period based on time to train new salesperson).
184See Varsity Gold v. Porzio, 45 P.3d 352, 358 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (prohibiting reformation
even if the resulting agreement is not ‘‘significantly different’’ from the original and even if
there is a clause in the agreement allowing reformation).
185111 P.3d 100 (Idaho 2005).
186Id. at 103.
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initiated to invalidate the noncompete agreement, the trial court found the
agreement overbroad and unenforceable.187
The court found that J-U-B had a legitimate interest in the protection
of its goodwill.188 However, in line with BDO Seidman,189 it defined this
interest narrowly to apply to ‘‘customer relationships its former employee
established and nurtured while employed by the employer.’’190 Given this
narrowly defined interest, the court found the noncompete agreement to
be fatally overbroad.191 J-U-B had a huge client base, a product of its
extensive engineering activities throughout the Northwest region for over
thirty years.192 Because the noncompete covenant precluded Freiburger
from doing work for any of these clients, it was not limited to those client
relationships that Freiburger had either established or helped develop
while at J-U-B. Moreover, the noncompete agreement prevented Freibur-
ger from providing any services to J-U-B’s past, current, or pending
clients.193 This effectively prevented Freiburger from working in any
capacity for one of J-U-B’s clients.
J-U-B argued that, if the noncompete agreement was overbroad,
then the court should modify its terms to render it reasonable under the
approach adopted in Insurance Center Inc. v. Taylor.194 The Freiburger court
declined to reform the covenant, however, because the agreement re-
187Id. at 104.
188As a preliminary matter, the Freiburger court addressed the standard of judicial scrutiny to
be applied to the noncompete agreement. The covenant was in the nature of an antipiracy or
nonsolicitation agreement, so the employer argued that the agreement should be subject to a
less demanding standard of review. Id. at 104–05. Because antipiracy covenants are less
onerous than general noncompete agreements, some courts have subjected them to a less
stringent standard of reasonableness. Id. at 105 (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Ran, 67 F. Supp. 2d 764 (E.D. Mich. 1999)). The Freiburger court rejected this approach,
opting for the common law standard as to whether the covenant is ‘‘no more restrictive than
necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate business interests.’’ Id. This standard, the court
believed, could be readily applied to any noncompete agreement, regardless of its form. Id.
189See supra notes 152–61 and accompanying text.
190Freiburger, 111 P.3d at 105.
191Id. at 106.
192Id. at 106–07.
193Id. at 107.
194499 P.2d 1252, 1256 (Idaho 1972) (adopting the reformation approach).
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quired substantial modifications to render it reasonable.195 The court
concluded that the clause was fatally overbroad and unenforceable as a
matter of law.196
Freiburger adopts an extremely restrictive approach to employee
noncompete agreements, one that is similar to the Arizona Supreme
Court’s approach in Valley Medical Specialists.197 The permissible scope of
an employee noncompete agreement designed to protect the goodwill of a
business was limited in two respects. First, any noncompete agreement
must be designed to prevent an employee from exploiting only those
customer or client relationships that it helped create for the employer.
Second, the type of competitive activities must be carefully defined to avoid
overbreadth and indefiniteness.198 Just as important, the court’s approach
to reforming an overbroad noncompete agreement is quite restrictive.
Substantial modifications of a noncompete agreement will not be per-
mitted, only slight changes and the striking out of overbroad language.
Although Insurance Center appeared to permit courts broader power to
reform noncompete agreements, Freiburger prohibits courts from rewriting
the terms of employee noncompete agreements.199
Consistent with Freiburger, the New Hampshire Supreme Court in
2005 adopted a restrictive approach to the protection of the goodwill
interest. In Merrimack Valley Wood Products, Inc. v. Near,200 the court
addressed the enforceability of a one-year noncompete agreement that
prevented an outside sales representative (Near) from doing business with
195The court explained:
Here, it would be necessary not only to strike some of the words of the Covenant, but in
addition, to add clauses relating to good will and relationships between Freiburger and
the clients and defining the parameters of what services Freiburger would be prohibited
from providing to J-U-B clients. This is far more than a ‘blue pencil’ approach to an
unreasonable word or two and would have the district court or this Court re-writing the
parties’ contract.
111 P.3d at 108.
196Id. at 106.
197See supra notes 182–83 and accompanying text.
198Freiburger, 111 P.3d at 106.
199Id. at 107–08.
200876 A.2d 757 (N.H. 2005).
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any customer of his former employers, Merrimack Valley Wood Products,
Inc. and American Cabinet Corp.201
In analyzing the breadth of the noncompete covenant, the court
reasoned that an employee’s ‘‘special influence’’ over his employer’s
customers is a legitimate interest an employer may protect against
competition.202 However, because Merrimack Valley Wood Products had
1,200 customers, only sixty of which Near regularly serviced, the former
employee had no particular hold on those customers with whom he had no
relationship.203 Because the noncompete agreement extended beyond
Near’s ‘‘sphere of customer goodwill,’’204 it was broader than reasonably
necessary to protect the former employer’s legitimate interest.205
The Merrimack Valley court could have reformed the agreement and
enforced it to the extent that it was reasonable. The court in Smith,
Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster 206 had allowed reformation of a noncompete
agreement as long as the employer acted in good faith. The trial court had
found bad faith in that Near was not apprised of any noncompete
obligation until he had worked for the companies for six months. The
Merrimack Valley court reasoned that the lack of advance notice was not
sufficient, standing alone, to constitute a lack of good faith. However, other
facts supported the trial court’s conclusion, including that the noncompete
agreement was not discussed with Near during the oral negotiations and
that the noncompete agreement was presented to Near on a ‘‘take it or
leave it’’ basis at a time when he was in no position to negotiate, having
already started work for the companies.207
Merrimack Valley requires an extremely close fit between the goodwill
interest and the restriction on competition. The ‘‘sphere of customer
influence’’ standard prevents a business from attempting to shield their
entire customer base from competition from former employees.208
201Id. at 762.
202Id. at 762–63 (citations omitted).
203Id. at 763–64.
204Id. at 764.
205Id. at 763–64.
206406 A.2d 1310 (N.H. 1979).
207Merrimack Valley, 876 A.2d at 765.
208Id. at 763.
144 Vol. 45 / American Business Law Journal
Merrimack Valley is also significant because it is part of an emerging trend
limiting the power of courts to reform overbroad noncompete agreements.
Merrimack Valley provides some process-based standards to judge whether
an employer has truly acted in good faith. Like Freiburger’s substantive
approach to the good faith requirement,209 the opinion suggests that, if an
employer overreaches in the drafting or negotiating of a noncompete
covenant, it may be invalidated in its entirety.
C. Tightened Statutory Restrictions on Employee Noncompete Agreements
Recent statutory developments parallel the heightened judicial scrutiny of
employee noncompete agreements under the common law reasonableness
standard. Opinions narrowly interpreting employee noncompete statutes,
and the adoption of a new restrictive statute in Oklahoma, demonstrate
another emerging trend: the tightening of statutory restrictions on
employee covenants not to compete.
In 2001 Oklahoma adopted an extremely restrictive employee
noncompete statute.210 The new law, Section 219A, allows only one type
of noncompete agreement, a nonsolicitation agreement preventing an
employee from directly soliciting the established customers of the former
employer’s business.211 The history of the Oklahoma statute is instructive.
Prior to the passage of Section 219A, the Oklahoma courts had interpreted
the state’s restraint of trade statute in a permissive fashion, applying a
reasonableness analysis to employee noncompete agreements.212 But in
Loewen Group Acquisition Corporation v. Matthews,213 the Oklahoma Court of
Civil Appeals invalidated a noncompete agreement in an opinion that set
the stage for the new statute. In that case, the manager of a funeral home
business, Matthews, was required to sign a noncompete agreement when
the business was acquired by the Loewen Group.214 The covenant
209See Freiburger, 111 P.3d at 107–08. See also supra notes 185–96 and accompanying text.
210OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 219A (Supp. 2007).
211Id. Other forms of employee restrictive covenants are prohibited under Oklahoma’s
general restraint of trade statute. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 217 (Supp. 2007).
212See, e.g., Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pickard, 780 P.2d 1168, 1170–71 (Okla. 1989). See also
supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text.
21312 P.3d 977 (Okla. Civ. App. 2000).
214Id. at 978.
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prohibited Matthews from engaging in any competing funeral home
business within fifteen miles of a Loewen Group business for a period of
three years after termination of his employment with Loewen Group.215
Matthews had extensive experience and contacts in the community, most
of which had been acquired before the takeover of the funeral homes by
the Loewen Group.216 The Court of Civil Appeals found that the agree-
ment was inherently unreasonable because Matthews was not using some
competitive advantage or opportunity from his employment to compete
with the Loewen Group.217
Section 219A essentially codifies the holding in Loewen. The statute is
quite restrictive. Only agreements restricting an employee from ‘‘directly
solicit[ing]’’ the ‘‘established customers of the former employer’’ are
permitted under the statute.218 It would appear, therefore, that not only
general noncompete agreements are unenforceable, but also agreements
that would prohibit a former employee from servicing or doing work for
established customers who contact or initiate the contract with the former
employee. The ‘‘directly solicit’’ language would appear to be limited to
active steps (for example, phone calls, direct marketing) on the part of a
former employee to get business from established customers of the former
employer.219
Similar in effect to the enactment of the Oklahoma statute, the North
Dakota and Louisiana Supreme Courts have issued opinions narrowly
interpreting their noncompete statutes,220 and the California Court of
215Id. at 978–79.
216Id. at 980–81.
217Id. at 982.
218OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 219A(a) (Supp. 2007).
219See Michael E. Chionopoulos, Covenants Not to Compete Could Create Competition in the
Courtroom, 73 OKLA. B.J. (2002), available at http://www.okbar.org/obj/articles_02/
sa040602.htm.
220SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond, 808 So. 2d 294, 296 (La. 2001) (‘‘[W]e interpret
the limited exception found in [the Louisiana non-compete statute] to the general nullity of
such agreements to apply only to those agreements in which the employee agrees to refrain
from carrying on or engaging in his own business similar to that of the employer.’’); Warner &
Co. v. Solberg, 634 N.W.2d 65, 71 (N.D. 2001) (refusing to create judicial exceptions to the
statute in the face of the statute’s plain language).
In SWAT 24, the court interpreted the statute to allow only employee noncompete
agreements where the employee carries on his own competing business, thereby refusing to
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Appeals has recently rejected a ‘‘narrow restraint’’ exception to Section
16600.221 In Warner and Company v. Solberg,222 the North Dakota Supreme
Court was urged to create a trade secret exception to the restraint of trade
statute, which would permit nonsolicitation agreements designed to
protect confidential customer lists.223 The argument for such an exception
was supported by case law from California that had recognized a trade
secret exception to Section 16600,224 and the Eighth Circuit’s decision in
Kovarik v. American Family Insurance,225 which upheld a one-year nonsoli-
citation agreement under North Dakota law.226
Despite the persuasive authority in favor of a limited customer-list
exception, the North Dakota court declined to create one. The court
placed reliance on the clear language of the statute, the history of
noncompete law in North Dakota, and the adoption of the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act (UTSA)227 in the state. First, the court considered the plain
meaning of the statute an unambiguous declaration of legislative intent
that any restraint on a person’s right to engage in a profession or business
is unlawful as a matter of public policy.228 Second, the court noted that
enforce a noncompete agreement that prevented the employee from going to work for a
competing business. 808 So. 2d at 307, 310. The Louisiana legislature modified the language
of the relevant statute to overrule SWAT 24. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921D (Supp. 2007).
221The California Court of Appeals, in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 788
(Cal. Ct. App.), rev. granted, 147 P.3d 1013 (Cal. 2006), refused to follow the Ninth Circuit’s
exception that allows noncompete agreements to restrict employees from a ‘‘small’’ segment
of a particular business or trade, concluding that the exception is inconsistent with the
language and history of Section 16600, with case law interpreting the statute, and contrary to
the public policies underlying the law. Id. at 800–03. The California Supreme Court has
granted review in the case, 147 P.3d at 1013.
222634 N.W.2d 65 (N.D. 2001).
223Id. at 69–70.
224See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. Because the North Dakota statute (Section 9-
08-06) is derived from the same Field Code provision as the California noncompete law, the
North Dakota courts have given weight to California opinions interpreting the restraint of
trade statute. Solberg, 634 N.W.2d at 70.
225108 F.3d 962 (8th Cir. 1997).
226Id. at 967.
227Unif. Trade Secrets Act §§ 1–11 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 434 (1990). See infra note 256
for a list of other states that have adopted the UTSA.
228Solberg, 634 N.W.2d at 71–72.
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attempts to amend the statute in the legislature to allow nonsolicitation
agreements had failed.229 Finally, the court reasoned that the California
decisions preceded the adoption of the UTSA in California.230 In light of
North Dakota’s adoption of the UTSA, the court questioned the need to
create a judicial exception for the protection of trade secrets.231 Thus, the
court took a restrictive view of the noncompete law despite substantial
authority for the creation of a limited judicial exception.
D. Summary
The emerging law of employee noncompete agreements significantly
restricts the power of employers to impose postemployment restrictions
on competition. What the trend of recent case law suggests is that the
courts are returning to the restrictive traditional approach to employee
noncompete agreements and moving away from the more permissive
modern standards. These opinions have made it more difficult for
employers to draft and to enforce covenants not to compete in the
employment setting. Employers attempting to restrict former employees
from engaging in competitive activities under the inevitable disclosure
doctrine have faced a similar hostile legal environment. As we discuss in
the next section, many courts have limited the reach of the inevitable
disclosure doctrine in the interests of employee mobility and open
competition.
VI. THE EMERGING LAW: LIMITING THE IMPOSITION
OF DE FACTO NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE
The 1995 opinion of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in PepsiCo v.
Redmond232 created renewed interest in the inevitable disclosure doctrine
229Id. at 71.
230Id. at 72.
231Id.
23254 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995). For recent commentary on the doctrine, see generally Renee
Cavalovitch, The Inevitable Demise of ‘‘Inevitable Disclosure’’ in California: Appellate Court Rejects the
Doctrine in Schlage Lock Co. v. Whyte, 22 J.L. & COM. 37 (2002); Adam Gill, The Inevitable
Disclosure Doctrine: Inequitable Results are Threatened but not Inevitable, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
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under which a court can enjoin a former employee from working for a
competitor of the employer to prevent an imminent threat of a trade secret
misappropriation.233 Under the doctrine, an injunction preventing em-
ployment can issue even if the employee is not bound by a noncompete
agreement and without any showing of an actual misappropriation of trade
secrets.234 Traditionally, the courts invoked inevitable disclosure to prevent
a competitor from unlawfully securing protected technology by hiring
away an employee with knowledge of specialized and highly valuable trade
secrets.235 But in PepsiCo, the Seventh Circuit developed a new formulation
for the inevitable disclosure doctrine under the UTSA,236 one that is not as
restrictive as the traditional common law approach.
A. The Development of the Common Law Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure
The inevitable disclosure doctrine preceded the widespread adoption of
the UTSA and the PepsiCo decision.237 As a matter of common law, the
doctrine developed in a series of cases involving the threatened misuse of
valuable, technical trade secrets by former employees hired away by
competitors seeking to gain entry into highly competitive markets. Thus,
the doctrine in its infancy was designed to prevent an imminent threat of a
trade secret disclosure by a former employee, a particularly damaging
form of unfair competition. The leading case is E.I. duPont de Nemours &
L.J. 403 (2002); Eleanore R. Godfrey, Inevitable Disclosure of Trade Secrets: Employee Mobility v.
Employer’s Rights, 3 J. HIGH TECH. L. 161 (2004); Joseph F. Phillips, Inevitable Disclosure Through
an Internet Lens: Is the Doctrine’s Demise Truly Inevitable?, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 395 (2003);
Elizabeth A. Rowe, When Trade Secrets Become Shackles: Fairness and the Inevitable Disclosure
Doctrine, 7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 167 (2005); Brandy L. Treadway, An Overview of
Individual States’ Application of Inevitable Disclosure: Concrete Doctrine or Equitable Tool?, 55 SMU
L. REV. 621 (2002).
233The inevitable disclosure doctrine is the ‘‘legal theory that a key employee, once hired by a
competitor, cannot avoid misappropriating the former employer’s trade secrets.’’ BLACK’s LAW
DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
234PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1270–71.
235See infra Part VI.A, discussing DuPont and Allis-Chalmers cases.
236Unif. Trade Secrets Act §§ 1–11 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 434 (1990).
237For an insightful discussion of the common law inevitable disclosure doctrine, see generally
Lawrence I. Weinstein, Revisiting the Inevitability Doctrine: When can a Former Employee who never
Signed a Non-Compete Agreement nor Threatened to Use or Disclose Trade Secrets be Prohibited from
Working for a Competitor, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 211 (1997).
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Co. [DuPont] v. American Potash & Chemical Corp.,238 in which the Delaware
Chancery Court granted an injunction in favor of DuPont against a former
employee who had access to a valuable trade secret process. Donald
Hirsch, a chemical engineer with a doctorate degree, had been involved
in the long and expensive effort to develop DuPont’s chloride process for
manufacturing certain pigments.239 After American Potash was unsuccess-
ful in securing a license from DuPont for that process, it decided to develop
its own chloride process. As part of that initiative, it hired Hirsch as a
technical manager for a new pigment manufacturing plant.240 DuPont
brought suit to enforce its confidentiality agreement, and it secured a
preliminary injunction stopping Hirsch from working for American Potash
in the field of chloride process development.241
In rejecting a summary judgment motion made by the defendants,
the court relied on the inevitability of the disclosure of the trade secrets by
Hirsch in finding a sufficient threat of improper disclosure. The court
viewed inevitability as a factor that it was justified in considering in
weighing the probabilities of a trade secret disclosure.242 The court
reasoned that the protection of trade secrets is important to society because
it encourages investment in R&D, although there is also a strong counter-
vailing interest in protecting the employee’s right to use knowledge and
skills that may be ‘‘inextricably interwoven with his knowledge of the trade
secrets.’’243 Given other facts pointing to the probability of an unlawful
disclosure, including a statement by Hirsch conceding the potential for a
conflict of interest occurring in his employment with American Potash,244
the court left the ultimate resolution for trial, with the preliminary
injunction in place to preserve the status quo.245
The DuPont opinion was followed by the federal district court opinion
in Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company v. Continental Aviation and Engineer-
238200 A.2d 428 (Del. Ch. 1964).
239Id. at 429–30.
240Id. at 431.
241Id. at 429–30.
242Id. at 436.
243Id. at 437.
244Id. at 435.
245Id. at 437.
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ing Corporation,246 a case that bore a striking factual similarity to DuPont.
Allis-Chalmers marketed a specialized type of fuel injector pump. At that
time, only three companies marketed this type of pump, and at least eight
American and foreign companies had attempted but failed to develop
comparable equipment.247 Allis-Chalmers negotiated with Continental
Aviation regarding the sale of its distributor pumps, but Continental
rejected a licensing agreement that would have granted Continental the
right to use Allis-Chalmers’ patent and trade secret rights in the manu-
facture of pumps for the military.248 The negotiations having failed,
Continental hired George Wolff, an engineer who was instrumental in
the development of Allis-Chalmers’ distributor pump, to work on the
design and development of Continental’s fuel injection systems and
pumps.249
In granting a preliminary injunction, which prevented Wolff from
doing certain work for Continental, the court found an ‘‘inevitable and
imminent’’ risk of trade secret misappropriation.250 This was based on the
‘‘negotiations, relating to distributor type fuel injection pumps . . . the
nature of the research and development work done by Mr. Wolff . . . at
Allis-Chalmers, [and] the nature of the type of work Mr. Wolff is to perform
at Continental.’’251 Given these facts, the court noted the ‘‘virtual impos-
sibility of Mr. Wolff performing all of his prospective duties for Continental
to the best of his ability, without in effect giving it the benefit of Allis-
Chalmers’ confidential information.’’252
The court granted an injunction that prevented Wolff from working
in the design of distributor-type pumps, but that allowed him to work for
Continental on other projects, including other pumps and fuel injection
systems.253 As in DuPont, the court was mindful of the competing legal
principles at play and the need to protect the rights of employees to market
246255 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
247Id. at 648.
248Id. at 650.
249Id. at 651–52.
250Id. at 654.
251Id.
252Id.
253Id. at 654–55.
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their general knowledge and skills while at the same time protecting the
intellectual property of employers.254 It therefore provided a limited
preliminary injunction, one that was narrowly tailored to protect the
threatened trade secrets.255
Allis-Chalmers and DuPont represent the prevailing approach to the
inevitable disclosure doctrine prior to PepsiCo. Both cases involved highly
specialized and technical trade secrets that gave the businesses a substantial
advantage in the market. Both also involved competitors that were
apparently attempting to acquire the protected technology by hiring away
high-level scientific personnel. Finally, the former employees would not
have been able to perform their new responsibilities without using or
disclosing their former employer’s trade secrets. Because there was an
imminent threat of misappropriation, and an injunction against disclosure
would not have been an adequate remedy, the courts granted narrow
injunctions preventing employment of the former employees in positions
where trade secrets were at risk.
B. The PepsiCo Formulation of Inevitable Disclosure
PepsiCo may not have been the first decision on inevitable disclosure, but it
was the first major case of inevitable disclosure decided under the UTSA
standards relating to a ‘‘threatened’’ misappropriation of a trade secret.256
Thus, PepsiCo has become the leading case on the doctrine, with courts
fashioning rules of inevitable disclosure based in large measure on the
PepsiCo facts and the Seventh Circuit’s legal reasoning.257 It is imperative,
254Id. at 654.
255Id. at 654–55.
256The UTSA has been adopted in forty-four states and the District of Columbia. See Uniform
Law Commissioners, A Few Facts About the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, http://www.nccusl.org/
Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-utsa.asp (last visited Sept. 26, 2007). The follow-
ing seven states adopted the original 1979 version of the UTSA: Arkansas, California,
Connecticut, Indiana, Louisiana, Rhode Island, and Washington. Id. The District of Columbia
and the following thirty-seven states adopted the UTSA as amended in 1985: Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. Id.
257See infra note 279.
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therefore, to understand the court’s rationale in PepsiCo to fully appreciate
the modern inevitable disclosure doctrine, its limitations and qualifications,
and its implications for employee mobility.
The dispute in PepsiCo arose out of the soda wars of the 1990s.
Quaker Oats held the dominant position in the sports-drink segment of the
market with its popular Gatorade brand. PepsiCo had entered the market
with the All Sport brand in 1994.258 In addition, the companies were rivals
in the new-age-drink segment of the market, with Quaker Oats having a
similar advantage because of its Snapple fruit drinks.259 PepsiCo intended
to increase its share of this segment in 1995 by capitalizing on joint
ventures with Ocean Spray Cranberries and Thomas J. Lipton Company.
William Redmond, a high-level executive with PepsiCo, took a similar
position with Quaker Oats in November 1994.260 Redmond had partici-
pated in the development of PepsiCo’s marketing plans and strategies for
1995, including sensitive information about ‘‘pricing architecture’’ and
‘‘attack plans’’ for specific markets.261 When Redmond went to work for
Quaker Oats, PepsiCo brought suit against Redmond and Quaker Oats
claiming an imminent threat of trade secret misappropriation. The district
court issued an injunction preventing Redmond from assuming his
position with Quaker Oats for a period of six months, a noncompete
period necessary to protect the heart of PepsiCo’s trade secrets, its strategic
plans for 1995.262
After reviewing case law and the Illinois Trade Secret Act,263 the
PepsiCo court concluded that ‘‘a plaintiff may prove a claim of trade secret
misappropriation by demonstrating that defendant’s new employment
will inevitably lead him to rely on the plaintiff ’s trade secrets.’’264 In
finding that PepsiCo demonstrated a likelihood of success on its misap-
propriation claim, the court relied on three circumstances. First, Redmond
had ‘‘extensive and intimate knowledge’’ of PepsiCo’s strategies for
258PepsiCo v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1264 (7th Cir. 1995).
259Id. at 1263–64.
260Id. at 1264.
261Id. at 1265.
262Id. at 1267.
263765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1065/1-9 (2007).
264PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1269.
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1995.265 Armed with that knowledge, Quaker Oats could achieve a
‘‘substantial advantage’’ by making decisions for Quaker Oats that would
effectively respond to PepsiCo’s marketing plans and actions.266 Second,
given the nature of Redmond’s position with Quaker Oats, it was im-
possible for him not to use his knowledge of PepsiCo’s strategies because
he would be making decisions with that information in mind.267 Unless he
had an ‘‘uncanny ability to compartmentalize information,’’ he would
undoubtedly use his knowledge of PepsiCo’s plans and strategies in his
position at Quaker Oats.268 Finally, the circuit court cited Redmond’s
apparent lack of candor, as determined by the district court,269 to support
its conclusion that misappropriation was inevitable, even as it conceded
that his conduct may have been innocent.270
Despite the court’s seemingly reasonable interpretation of the facts,
the case for inevitable disclosure in PepsiCo was not as strong as in DuPont.
First, PepsiCo did not involve the type of technical, resource-intensive,
and highly valuable trade secrets at risk in DuPont. Although the
marketing information in PepsiCo was properly considered a trade
secret,271 the value of this type of soft managerial information to a
competitor is not as apparent as the type of hard technical information
in DuPont. Second, the intent to secure protected technology by hiring
away a knowledgeable employee is not clear from the circumstances in
PepsiCo. Redmond was hired by the dominant player in the market,272 not
a competitor attempting to develop unlawfully technology that it was
unable to develop lawfully. Therefore, the argument for the inevitability of
a trade secret disclosure is not as strong as it was in DuPont. Finally, the
evidence that Redmond would use this marketing information, or that it
would be impossible for him not to use it, is not as compelling as in DuPont.
The distribution channels employed by PepsiCo and Quaker Oats were
265Id.
266Id. at 1270.
267Id. at 1269.
268Id.
269Id. at 1270.
270Id. at 1271.
271Id. at 1268.
272Id. at 1264, 1265.
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different273 and Redmond ostensibly was hired to integrate the distribution
of the Gatorade and Snapple lines under a preexisting company plan.274
Although knowledge of PepsiCo’s strategies might be useful to Quaker Oats,
it would appear to have limited value to Redmond in his new position.
PepsiCo is a significant expansion of the common law inevitable
disclosure doctrine. The court’s approach changes both the focus and
critical elements of an inevitable disclosure case. Under DuPont, the focus
was on preventing a form of competition by former employees that
involves a high probability of a trade secret misappropriation.275 Under
the common law approach, the determinative factors are (1) the existence
of valuable, technical, and specialized trade secrets giving the former
employer a strong position in the market; (2) the hiring away of employees
with knowledge of those trade secrets in an attempt by a competitor to
improperly secure that technology; and (3) employment of the former
employee in a position where it would be impossible for the employee to
perform without using the trade secret information.276 If such elements
are present, a limited noncompete injunction is necessary to prevent an
imminent threat of a trade secret misappropriation.
PepsiCo focuses on the need to protect businesses from all forms of
competition by former employees who are hired by direct competitors in
situations where the potential exists for the former employees to
exploit knowledge acquired in their prior employment. The key PepsiCo
factors are (1) the degree of competition between the new and former
employers, (2) the closeness between the employee’s old and new posi-
tions, and (3) the extensiveness of the former employee’s knowledge of
technical or managerial trade secrets.277 Evidence of bad faith on the part
of the employee provides support for but is not essential to a finding of
273Id. at 1264.
274Id. at 1265.
275See supra notes 238–45 and accompanying text.
276See Jonathan O. Harris, Note, The Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure: A Proposal to Balance
Employer and Employee Interests, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 325, 328 (2000).
277See Proctor & Gamble v. Stoneham, 747 N.E.2d 268, 279 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (‘‘According
to the inevitable-disclosure rule, a threat of harm warranting injunctive relief can be shown by
facts establishing that an employee with detailed and comprehensive knowledge of an
employer’s trade secrets and confidential information has begun employment with a
competitor of the former employer in a position that is substantially similar to the position
held during the former employment.’’).
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inevitable disclosure under PepsiCo.278 Because wrongful intent is not an
essential element under the PepsiCo formulation, the burden on the former
employer to prove inevitability is not as demanding as under the common
law standard. Essentially, the PepsiCo court developed a new model of the
typical inevitable disclosure case. Thus, PepsiCo represents a fundamental
legal paradigm shift.
PepsiCo has had a significant impact on the inevitable disclosure
doctrine. Subsequent to the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, many state and
federal courts adopted the inevitable disclosure doctrine279 or considered
it in trade secret litigation without expressly adopting it.280 Most have also
followed the PepsiCo court’s logic and its formulation of the doctrine,
employing the factors identified in the opinion on the inevitability ques-
tion.281 Although the courts that have embraced inevitable disclosure have
not done so in an entirely consistent fashion,282 the doctrine is now
considered the majority rule.283
278PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1262.
279E.g., RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 177 F. Supp. 2d 859, 875–77 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Lexis-Nexis v. Beer,
41 F. Supp. 2d 950, 959 (D. Minn. 1999); Strata Mktg., Inc. v. Murphy, 740 N.E.2d 1166, 1178
(Ill. App. Ct. 2000); Sw. Energy Co. v. Eickenhorst, 955 F. Supp. 1078, 1085 (W.D. Ark. 1997),
aff ’d, 175 F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 1999). Though influential, PepsiCo obviously was not the origin of
the inevitable disclosure doctrine. See, e.g., Nat’l Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Parker Chem. Corp.,
530 A.2d 31, 33 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (adopting the inevitable disclosure doctrine
prior to the decision in PepsiCo). See also Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1460
(M.D.N.C. 1996) (finding that the PepsiCo factors which consider ‘‘the degree of competition
between the former and new employer, and the new employer’s efforts to safeguard the
former employer’s trade secrets, and the former employee’s ‘lack of forthrightness’. . . and . . .
the degree of similarity between the former employee’s former and current position,’’ were
consistent with previous North Carolina decisions).
280E.g., Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Lockhart, 5 F. Supp. 2d 667, 681–82 (S.D. Ind. 1998)
(discussing the doctrine and PepsiCo but concluding that the record would not support a
finding of inevitable disclosure).
281See, e.g., Lexis-Nexis, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 959; Eickenhorst, 955 F. Supp. at 1085; Uncle B’s
Bakery, Inc. v. O’Rourke, 920 F. Supp. 1405, 1435–36 (N.D. Iowa 1996); La Calhene v.
Spolyar, 938 F. Supp. 523, 531 (W.D. Wis. 1996); Stoneham, 747 N.E.2d at 278–80.
282Treadway, supra note 232, at 623 (‘‘In drawing a comparison between the states, it becomes
apparent that no two enforce the same version of inevitable disclosure.’’).
283Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 291 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). (‘‘Our survey
confirms the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have adopted some form of the
inevitable disclosure doctrine.’’).
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C. The Judicial Assault on the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
The PepsiCo opinion triggered a significant amount of scholarly criticism,
most of it directed at the doctrine’s negative effects on employees.284
Critics argue that the adoption of the PepsiCo formulation has the potential
to allow employers to circumvent employee noncompete law and thereby
upset the delicate policy balance between an employee’s interest in
mobility and an employer’s interest in protecting its proprietary informa-
tion.285 In apparent response to the policy implications of the inevitable
disclosure doctrine, many courts have retreated from the broadest reading
of PepsiCo or have rejected the doctrine outright. This subsection addresses
the various avenues of retreat that such courts have followed.
Some jurisdictions applying the inevitable disclosure doctrine have
given it a limited or narrow reach by requiring more than the ‘‘inevit-
ability’’ evidence of PepsiCo.286 H & R Block Eastern Tax Services, Inc. v.
Enchura287 is illustrative. In Enchura, the employees (Enchura and Fortner)
were both regional directors for H & R Block who were hired away by
major competitors of the tax return preparation firm.288 Although their
primary responsibility as regional directors was the management of the
company-owned offices, both employees were privy to trade secret infor-
mation, including information from a Tax Operations National Meeting in
September that they both attended before they quit.289
The Enchura court found that ‘‘demonstrated inevitability alone is
insufficient to justify injunctive relief; rather, demonstrated inevitability in
284E.g., John H. Matheson, Employee Beware: The Irreparable Damage of the Inevitable Disclosure
Doctrine, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 145 (1998); Susan Street Whaley, The Inevitable Disaster of
Inevitable Disclosure, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 809 (1999); Rebecca J. Berkun, Comment, The Dangers of
the Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure in Pennsylvania, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 157 (2003); Johanna
L. Edelstein, Note, Intellectual Slavery?: The Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure of Trade Secrets, 26
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 717 (1996).
285See, e.g., Matheson, supra note 284, at 160; Whaley, supra note 284, at 836; Berkun, supra
note 284, at 173–75.
286E.g., IBM v. Seagate Tech., 941 F. Supp. 98, 101 (D. Minn. 1992) (requiring a high
probability of inevitable disclosure, noting that mere possession of trade secrets and the
former employee holding similar position with a competitor are insufficient to sustain that
burden).
287122 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (W.D. Mo. 2000).
288Id. at 1070, 1072.
289Id. at 1070–71.
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combination with a finding that there is an unwillingness to preserve
confidentiality is required.’’290 ‘‘To prevail under this theory, employers
must demonstrate inevitability exists with facts indicating that the nature of
the secrets at issue and the nature of the employee’s past and future work
justify an inference that the employee cannot help but consider secret
information.’’291 Applying these restrictive standards, the court concluded
that there was insufficient evidence to support a claim of inevitability and
no showing of unwillingness on the part of Enchura and Fortner to respect
the confidentiality of H & R Block’s trade secrets.292 The former employ-
ees would not be making decisions in the same areas covered by the trade
secrets. Thus, there was minimal risk that they could exploit the informa-
tion.293 Also, unlike in PepsiCo, they had not participated in the develop-
ment of the marketing plans.294 Nor could they have easily memorized the
voluminous information presented at the September meeting.295 Thus, a
finding of inevitable disclosure was not justified by the facts.
Cases like Enchura296 represent a retreat from the more expansive
view of PepsiCo adopted by some courts.297 Enchura’s requirement of
inevitability plus298 imposes a heavy burden on former employers to
demonstrate a real threat of a trade secret misappropriation. Enchura
and other court opinions requiring inevitability plus may reflect dissatis-
faction with the utility of the PepsiCo formulation. Because the PepsiCo
factors will often exist in any case where a high-level employee takes a
290Id. at 1075 (emphasis in original).
291Id. at 1076.
292Id. at 1075–76.
293Id. at 1075.
294Id. at 1072, 1075.
295Id. at 1071.
296See, e.g., Uncle B’s Bakery v. O’Rourke, 920 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Novell, Inc. v.
Timpanogos Research Group, Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1197 (Utah D. Ct. 1998).
297See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Stoneham, 747 N.E.2d 268 (Ohio 2000).
298This phrase was coined by the court in Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 148
F. Supp. 2d 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2001), in which the court rejected the PepsiCo doctrine of inevitable
disclosure. Id. at 1336–37. Citing to Enchura, the court reasoned that mere possession of trade
secrets is insufficient to prove a threatened misappropriation. To demonstrate a substantial
threat, inevitability and an unwillingness to preserve confidentiality is necessary, the ‘‘inevit-
ability-plus requirement.’’ Id. at 1338.
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position with a competitor, the courts need other factors to differentiate
between a potential misuse of trade secrets by a former employee and an
inevitable one.
Most recently, several jurisdictions have either rejected the inevitable
disclosure doctrine outright or have seriously questioned its legitimacy
from a public policy standpoint. Concern has focused primarily on the
negative effects the doctrine has on the rights of employees. In particular,
courts note that imposing a de facto noncompete agreement without the
employee’s consent is unfair.299 In addition, courts are concerned about
broadening postemployment restrictions on employees under the guise of
trade secret protection.300
Whether California would follow the PepsiCo lead in light of its
restrictive employee noncompete statute was unclear for some time.301
The issue was definitively resolved in 2002 with the California appeals
court opinion in Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co.,302 a case that bore a striking
resemblance to PepsiCo. The litigation involved two competitors in the
manufacture and sale of locks and related products, Schlage Lock Co. and
Kwikset.303 As the vice president of sales for Schlage, Whyte was respon-
sible for sales to ‘‘big box’’ retailers, including Home Depot. He had
successfully negotiated a ‘‘line review’’ agreement with Home Depot that
expanded Schlage’s presence on the retailer’s shelves and removed
Kwikset’s Titan brand.304 Impressed with Whyte’s skills, Kwikset’s pre-
sident hired him away from Schlage. Whyte accepted the position on June
3, 2000, but did not formally resign until after a confidential meeting
299See infra notes 309–10 & 334–35 and accompanying text.
300See infra notes 315–19 and accompanying text.
301In Electro Optical Industries, Inc. v. White, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), a
California appeals court expressly adopted the doctrine. Id. at 684. This opinion was later
ordered to be unpublished by the California Supreme Court. Electro Optical Indus., Inc. v.
White, 2000 Cal. LEXIS 3536 (Cal. Apr. 12, 2000). Although one federal district court found
inevitable disclosure part of California trade secrets law, Maxxim Medical, Inc. v. Michelson,
51 F. Supp. 2d 773 (S.D. Tex. 1999), rev’d without opinion, 182 F.3d 915 (5th Cir. 1999), the
federal courts generally ruled that inevitable disclosure was not the law in California. E.g.,
Danjaq, LLC v. Sony Corp., No. CV 97-8414-ER, 1999 WL 317629, at n1 n.1 (C.D. Cal. Mar.
11, 1999) (‘‘PepsiCo is not the law of the State of California or the Ninth Circuit.’’).
302125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
303Id. at 281.
304Id.
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between Schlage and Home Depot on June 5.305 Litigation ensued there-
after, with Schlage claiming a misappropriation of trade secrets.306
The Whyte court joined what it characterized as a ‘‘growing band of
cases’’ rejecting inevitable disclosure, cases that it believed ‘‘correctly
balanced competing public policies of employee mobility and protection
of trade secrets.’’307 California’s policy of protecting employee mobility was
not viewed as entirely inconsistent with the inevitable disclosure doctrine,
because a narrow nonsolicitation agreement (for example, restraining
Whyte from selling to Home Dept) might be consistent with California’s
restrictive employee noncompete statute.308 What the court found perni-
cious was the ‘‘after-the-fact’’ nature of the covenant not to compete
imposed under the doctrine, a covenant imposed without the employee’s
consent.309 The court argued that the doctrine has the effect of converting
a confidentiality agreement into a noncompete covenant:
The doctrine of inevitable disclosure thus rewrites the employment agreement
and ‘such retroactive alterations distort the terms of the employment relation-
ship and upset the balance which courts have attempted to achieve in
construing non-compete agreements.’ . . . As a result of the inevitable dis-
closure doctrine, the employer obtains the benefit of a contractual provision it
did not pay for, while the employee is bound by a court-imposed contract
provision with no opportunity to negotiate terms or consideration.310
The Whyte court was particularly influenced by a federal district court
opinion from New York.311 In EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack,312 the court
rejected the application of the doctrine to prevent a high-level executive
of an Internet publishing company from assuming a similar position with a
new competitor.313 In resolving the inevitable disclosure claim, the court
305Id. at 282.
306Id.
307Id. at 292.
308Id. at 292–93.
309Id. at 293.
310Id. (citations omitted).
311Id. (citing EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 310–11 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)).
31271 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff ’d, 205 F.3d 1322 (2d Cir. 2000).
313Id. at 302.
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provided the strongest judicial critique of the doctrine to date. The court
recognized that the inevitable disclosure doctrine was not newFcourts
had restrained employees under noncompete agreements where employ-
ees possessed sensitive information that they would inevitably use in
competing with their former employers.314 But it viewed PepsiCo and the
cases adopting it as extending the doctrine beyond the noncompete
context.315 Although this extension was not problematic where there was
evidence of actual misappropriation of trade secrets by competing former
employees, it presented serious risks to the policies underlying employee
noncompete law in situations in which the employees had not signed
binding noncompete agreements.316 The court also believed that this
doctrine would have in terrorem effects on employees and upset the delicate
balance of rights under noncompete law.317 Finally, unlike the noncompete
context, courts are left without any ‘‘frame of reference’’ to judge reason-
ableness; rather, the courts must decide questions of ‘‘inevitability,’’ a
nebulous concept that would spawn litigation.318 Predictability in the
employment relationship is better served when the parties negotiate
noncompete terms.319 Thus, the EarthWeb court concluded that the
doctrine ‘‘treads an exceedingly narrow path through judicially disfavored
territory,’’ one that should be taken in only the ‘‘rarest of cases.’’320
314Id. at 309.
315Id. at 309–10.
316Id. at 310.
317The court explained:
Among these risks is the imperceptible shift in bargaining power that necessarily occurs
upon the commencement of an employment relationship marked by the execution of a
confidentiality agreement. When that relationship eventually ends, the parties’ con-
fidentiality agreement may be wielded as a restrictive covenant, depending on how the
employer views the new job its former employee has accepted. This can be a powerful
weapon in the hands of an employer; the risk of litigation alone may have a chilling effect
on the employee.
Id.
318Id. at 311.
319Id.
320Id. at 310.
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EarthWeb is significant for several reasons. First, it provides a power-
ful argument against the inevitable disclosure doctrine, a critique that is
founded on solid policy and practical concerns. Second, it is part of a
growing judicial hostility toward the inevitable disclosure doctrine.321
Although EarthWeb did not repudiate the doctrine altogether, its policy
critique supports a narrow reading of PepsiCo and justifies limiting the
application of inevitable disclosure to ‘‘rare cases.’’322 Finally, EarthWeb’s
influence in New York, an important jurisdiction, already has been felt.
Several state and federal courts have embraced the EarthWeb rationale and
limited the application of the doctrine in New York.323 Prior to EarthWeb,
New York courts had been far more receptive to the inevitable disclosure
doctrine.324
The EarthWeb critique has also influenced other courts outside of
New York. The 2004 Maryland Court of Appeals decision, LeJeune v. Coin
Acceptors, Inc.,325 rejected the inevitable disclosure doctrine relying heavily
on EarthWeb and Whyte. LeJeune is one of only a handful of inevitable
disclosure cases to be decided by a state’s highest court.326 Most of the case
law in support of inevitable disclosure has been at the federal level.
LeJeune is important because it may signal that state courts are going to
be more reluctant to embrace the PepsiCo formulation than the federal
courts.327
321Whyte, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 292 (citing EarthWeb among others as ‘‘[a] smaller but growing
band of cases [that] rejects the inevitable disclosure doctrine’’).
322Id.
323See, e.g., PSC, Inc. v. Reiss, 111 F. Supp. 2d 252, 256–59 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (relying on
EarthWeb to apply inevitable disclosure doctrine strictly and deny request for injunction);
Marietta Corp. v. Fairhurst, 754 N.Y.S.2d 62, 64–65, 67 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (noting, with
reference to EarthWeb, that inevitable disclosure is disfavored and reversing grant of
injunction based on inevitable disclosure).
324E.g., Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624, 631 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding inevitable
disclosure).
325849 A.2d 451 (Md. 2004).
326The Arkansas Supreme Court decision in Cardinal Freight Carriers, Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transport
Services, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 642 (Ark. 1999), is the only state supreme court opinion to have
expressly adopted inevitable disclosure. Id. at 646–47.
327Other state court opinions have rejected the PepsiCo formulation of inevitable disclosure.
E.g., Gov’t Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Intellisys Tech. Corp., No. 160265, 1999 WL 1499548 (Va. Cir.
Ct. Oct. 20, 1999). The North Carolina Court of Appeals also rejected the PepsiCo doctrine in
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From a factual perspective, LeJeune provided the Maryland court
with a fairly compelling case for the application of the inevitable disclosure
doctrine. Like PepsiCo, the lawsuit involved two direct competitors in the
coin machine market, Coin Acceptors, Inc. (Coinco), and Mars Electronics,
Inc. (Mars).328 LeJeune was an Area Account Manager for Coinco,
responsible for the vending market in Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
and West Virginia. He also was involved with marketing a new bill acceptor
machine to the amusement market in early 2003. He was exposed to
sensitive business information and was knowledgeable about Coinco’s
marketing and pricing strategies.329 He left Coinco in the summer of
2003 to work for Mars as the Amusement OEM (Original Equipment
Manufacturer) Manager.330 Prior to leaving, he copied from his laptop
numerous Coinco documents containing information about Coinco’s
budgeting, manufacturing costs, profit margins, and pricing. In addition,
he retained hard copies of documents containing other sensitive informa-
tion, including technical specifications on Coinco’s new bill acceptor
machine.331
The LeJeune court noted that pre-UTSA cases on inevitable disclosure
had involved ‘‘extraordinary situations in which a company tried to guard
the secrecy of some technology that had propelled the company into
industry leadership.’’332 It further observed that PepsiCo was the ‘‘most
notable’’ inevitable disclosure case under the UTSA, but that the theory
itself is the subject of ‘‘considerable disagreement.’’333 In resolving the
issue in Maryland, the court found the reasoning of Whyte and EarthWeb
Analog Devices, Inc. v. Michalski, 579 S.E.2d 449 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003). The court refused to
follow the lead of the federal court in Merck & Co. Inc. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443 (M.D. N.C.
1996). Although Lyon had embraced the PepsiCo approach, the Analog Devices court held that
an injunction restraining employment would only be issued if there was a showing of ‘‘bad
faith, underhanded dealing, or inferred misappropriation (justified by circumstances tending
to show the new employer plainly lacks comparable technology).’’ 579 S.E.2d at 455 n.4. In so
ruling, the Analog Devices court did not even discuss the federal court decision in Lyon.
328LeJeune, 849 A.2d at 454.
329Id. at 455.
330Id. at 456.
331Id.
332Id. at 469.
333Id. at 470.
2008 / Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete Agreements 163
persuasive. It agreed with the Whyte court that the doctrine creates a de
facto noncompete agreement that is inconsistent with long-standing
policies in Maryland law favoring employee mobility.334 Also, the doctrine
has the effect of permitting an inference of trade secret disclosure merely
because an employee was privy to secret information. Adoption of the
theory also would tend to permit a court to infer some inevitable disclosure
of trade secrets merely from an individual’s exposure to them.335
Courts are rightly concerned with the detrimental impact that the
inevitable disclosure doctrine has on the delicate policy balance between
the employer’s interest in information protection and the employee’s
competing interest in free mobility. Because the PepsiCo formulation upsets
that delicate balance, most courts will probably continue to adopt stan-
dards for inevitable disclosure that more closely resemble the common law.
VII. PUBLIC POLICY AND EMPLOYEE MOBILITY:
THE NEW EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP AND THE
INFORMATION-AGE ECONOMY
Recent noncompete cases reveal a distinct trend heightening the judicial
scrutiny of employee agreements not to compete,336 a trend that is
mirrored in the most recent opinions on the inevitable disclosure doc-
trine.337 It has become more difficult for employers to enforce covenants
not to compete and this new legal environment presents challenges to
drafting enforceable noncompete agreements. These recent developments
signal a shift to a strict approach to such restrictive covenants founded on a
dominant policy concern for the protection of employee mobility.
The heightened scrutiny of employee noncompete agreements
reflects some of the fundamental changes taking place in the economy
and in the workplace. Both management and law scholars have commented
334Id at 471 (‘‘To recognize ‘inevitable disclosure’ in this case would allow Coinco the benefit of
influencing LeJeune’s employment relationship with Mars even though Coinco chose not to
negotiate a restrictive covenant or confidentiality agreement with LeJeune.’’).
335But see infra note 436 and accompanying text, which notes that most courts have not
endorsed such an inference.
336See supra Part V.
337See supra Part VI.C.
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on the changing nature of the employment relationship, particularly the
movement away from the traditional long-term employment relationship
typical in the industrial age.338 Scholars also have commented on the
benefits of information sharing and employee mobility in the information-
age economy.339 These interrelated changes have significant implications
for the evolving law of employee noncompete agreements.
A. The New Employment Relationship
A new employment relationship has emerged from the restructuring of the
American economy that began in the 1980s.340 The paradigm of the pre–
information-age employment relationship is rapidly dying.341 The indus-
trial employment relationship was characterized by long-term commit-
ments from employers and employees, advancement within a firm, and job
security.342 This relationship was beneficial to businesses in the industrial
economy because it facilitated long-term business planning and allowed
firms to invest heavily in employee training.343 Also, it created an implied
quid pro quoFemployers guaranteeing employment and the potential for
advancement within the firm in exchange for employee loyalty and
commitment.344 This psychological contract enhanced productivity in
the workplace. Finally, promotion within the organization provided the
means for employees to advance in their careers, and this was facilitated
by tiered business structures with multiple layers of management.345
338See, e.g., PETER CAPELLI, THE NEW DEAL AT WORK, MANAGING THE MARKET-DRIVEN WORKFORCE
(1999); Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A Reconsidera-
tion of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 1163
(2001); Katherine V. W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes over the Ownership of Human Capital in
the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721 (2002).
339E.g., Bishara, supra note 23; Gilson, supra note 43; Alan Hyde, The Wealth of Shared
Information: Silicon Valley’s High-Velocity Labor Market, Endogenous Economic Growth, and the Law
of Trade Secrets (Sept. 1998), http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/hyde/WEALTH.htm.
340CAPELLI, supra note 338, at 4–5.
341Stone, supra note 338, at 725–29.
342Id. at 725.
343CAPELLI, supra note 338, at 63–64.
344Stone, supra note 338, at 725.
345Id.
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Employee noncompete agreements were well suited to the old employ-
ment relationship, because restrictive covenants have the effect of stifling
employee mobility.
The new employment relationship substitutes external market forces
for the internal labor market of the industrial age.346 Its primary char-
acteristics are employee mobility, a lack of job security, and limited loyalty
by either employees or employers. Employers ensure the viability of the
firm by maintaining its competitiveness, which requires rapid changes in
strategies and plans because of short time horizons for product and service
developments.347 Competition at home and abroad has caused firms to
become more cost conscious. Globalization and competition also have
forced firms to downsize and restructure their business organizations.348
Firms also must be responsive to external financial markets.349 Maintain-
ing the profitability and standing of the firm with investors often requires
drastic cost-cutting measures when the firm’s profits are not as expected in
the market.350 In this environment, massive layoffs have become common-
place and employees are becoming used to this environment of job
insecurity.
The new employment relationship is more uncertain and flexible
than the industrial model. A new psychological contract is emerging that
reflects the realities of the new workplace.351 Under the new implicit quid
pro quo, employers do not make a long-term commitment of employment
and job security in exchange for the loyalty of the employee.352 Rather, if
the employer makes any implied commitment at all, it is that employment
will provide employees with the skills and experiences necessary to make
them competitive in the market. Employability, not employment, is what the
346CAPELLI, supra note 338, at 17–48.
347Id. at 5, 49–68.
348Stone, supra note 338, at 729.
349CAPELLI, supra note 338, at 81–85 (noting shareholder pressure on firms).
350Id. at 80 (noting positive investor reaction to slashing jobs at Xerox, a very well-run
company).
351Stone, supra note 338, at 729–31.
352See Marleen A. O’Connor, Restructuring the Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a
Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1205–07 (1991) (explaining long-
term relationships between employees and employers).
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employer implicitly offers in exchange for the employee’s efforts and
productivity.353
Scholars have argued that employee noncompete agreements are a
necessary means to protect a firm’s investment in its employees.354
Professors Paul Rubin and Peter Shedd claim that some forms of employee
training may result in employees acquiring firm-specific knowledge, and
the costs of that training cannot be shifted to the employee through wage
adjustments.355 Noncompete agreements are necessary, they argue, to
provide firms with some protection for the costs incurred in providing
sensitive human capital, because competitors could reap the benefits of
that information by hiring away employees of the firm.356
But given the new employment relationship, the underlying assump-
tions about protecting human capital development have been questioned.
It has been argued that employees should be given ‘‘broad rights to
acquire, retain, and deploy their human capital’’ under the new psycho-
logical contract in which employers offer ‘‘employability’’ rather than
employment.357 This is consistent with the implicit understanding between
the parties as to the ownership of human capital. Alternatives to the
enforcement of noncompete agreements also exist in those situations
where specialized training is provided, including training repayment
agreements.358
353CAPELLI, supra note 338, at 29–30 (‘‘Most of the new deals refer to this as the ‘employability’
concept: We cannot offer you security with our company, but we can help you to secure skills
that will keep you employable, that will lead to some security in the labor market by helping
you find other jobs.’’); ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, ROSABETH MOSS KANTER ON THE FRONTIERS OF
MANAGEMENT 190–94 (1997); Mark V. Roehling et al., The Nature of the New Employment
Relationship(s): A Content Analysis of the Practitioner and Academic Literatures, 39 HUM. RESOURCE
MGMT. 305, 312–13 (2000) (discussing the use of the term employability in practice and scholarship
and distinguishing between ‘‘internal employability’’ and ‘‘external employability’’).
354See, e.g., Maureen B. Callahan, Post-Employment Restraint Agreements: A Reassessment, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 703, 716–18 (1985) (arguing that noncompete agreements are the employer’s only
means of protecting its investment in human capital); Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human
Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 96–99 (1981) (arguing that
noncompete agreements are necessary when, for example, ‘‘general training’’ costs are too high
for employees to self-ﬁnance).
355Rubin & Shedd, supra note 354, at 96–99.
356See Long, supra note 111, at 1302.
357Stone, supra note 338, at 763.
358See supra note 109–11 and accompanying text.
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Overall, restrictive covenants seem ill suited to the emerging employ-
ment relationship where job insecurity and employee mobility are key
features. Rigorous enforcement of employee noncompete agreements also
would appear to be inconsistent with the implied commitment of employ-
ability under the new psychological contract.359
B. Information Sharing and Technological Innovation
There is considerable debate about the economics of enforcing noncom-
pete agreements to protect secret business information, particularly in the
emerging high-technology economy. The traditional view was that the
protection of trade secrets under noncompete law was necessary to provide
firms with the incentive to engage in expensive R&D activities.360 Those
R&D activities lead to innovations in products and services and thereby
make firms more competitive. Without legal protection for such new
innovations, firms would be unwilling to make the same level of R&D
expenditures, because competitors would be able to gain the knowledge
underlying those innovations by hiring away employees of the firm.361
Information sharing in this context, therefore, causes negative economic
effects by reducing the level of R&D that all firms undertake or by
increasing the costs of protecting the knowledge that firms develop.
Even those who espouse the traditional economic view of trade secret
protection under employee noncompete agreements must recognize the
limitations of the classical model. First, employee noncompete agreements
can be anticompetitive under certain circumstances, and employers may
engage in attempts to unfairly restrict competition. If protected infor-
mation or specialized training is not involved, employee noncompete
agreements may be a means by which firms with market power maintain
their position by restricting the flow of information or eliminating
the potential for new market entrants.362 Second, enforcement of
359Stone, supra note 338, at 738 (arguing that judicial approaches to noncompete agreements
that favor employers are ‘‘out of step with the new employment relationship’’).
360See, e.g., Callahan, supra note 354, at 715 (‘‘To the extent that inventors are prevented from
reaping the benefits of the information they develop, they are discouraged from engaging in
costly research and development, and competition will suffer because fewer products will be
produced.’’).
361See id.
362Id. at 716–18.
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employee noncompete agreements causes a misallocation of scarce human
resources. From a macroeconomic standpoint, human resources are
not put to their most efficient uses when noncompete agreements force
employees to work outside of their professions or fields of expertise.363
Third, protection of secret information under intellectual property
law is never absolute. Thus, the important public policy question is the
balance between information sharing and information protection. For
example, we allow the discovery and exploitation of trade secret
information through some means, such as reverse engineering.364 Under
the trade secret regime, the law balances the negative and positive
effects of protecting information. Information sharing is often essential
for healthy competition and a proper functioning of the market;365 yet
some level of information protection is also critical for innovation and
technological advancement. Just as the extent to which we allow copying
and imitation of products and services reflects this balance, so does
the extent to which we allow employees to engage in postemployment
competition.
Some commentators have challenged the classical economic view of
noncompete agreements, asserting that restrictive covenants conflict with
the need for rapid knowledge transfers and innovation in a high-technol-
ogy environment.366 Scholars have claimed that the enforcement of
employee noncompete agreements may actually reduce technological
advancement and economic growth.367 These arguments are supported
by the groundbreaking work of Professor AnnaLee Saxenian, who
studied the rise of Silicon Valley in the high-technology sector during the
363See Blake, supra note 23, at 627 (noncompetes agreements may ‘‘clog the market’s
channeling of manpower to employments in which its productivity is greatest’’).
364E.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490 (1974) (‘‘[T]rade secret law does
not forbid the discovery of the trade secret by fair and honest means, e. g., independent
creation or reverse engineering.’’); Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400, 405 (9th Cir.
1982) (‘‘A [consumer]’s own reverse-engineering of [a product] . . . is an example of the
independent invention and reverse engineering expressly allowed by trade secret doctrine.’’).
365Callahan, supra note 354, at 715 (conceding that ‘‘competition by way of product imitation
and improvement requires the free flow of information’’).
366E.g., Gilson, supra note 43; Hyde, supra note 339.
367Employee noncompete agreement ‘‘present a barrier to the second-stage agglomeration
economy that sustains a high technology district.’’ Gilson, supra note 43, at 607. See also Chris
Montville, Reforming The Law Of Proprietary Information, 56 DUKE L.J. 1159, 1192 (2007).
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1980s.368 As Saxenian’s study documents, Silicon Valley experienced far
greater economic growth than the Route 128 region of Massachusetts
during this period, and this occurred despite Route 128’s strong position
in the electronics and computer industries in the 1970s.369 Saxenian
attributes Silicon Valley’s relative success to the differing cultures and
structures of the two industrial regions.370 Silicon Valley was dominated by
small firms with frequent employee crossover and a culture of information
sharing.371 Route 128 was dominated by large integrated firms with
minimal employee turnover and an environment of secrecy.372 Professor
Saxenian’s study indicates that the Valley’s culture of relatively free
employee mobility, information sharing, and entrepreneurial activity
created the booming industrial district.373 Her study further indicates that
the reason Silicon Valley surpassed Route 128 during this period of time
was due to the knowledge spillovers that occurred as employees changed
firms and started new businesses.374 This culture of information sharing
drove the rapid development of new technologies and had positive
economic effects on the region.375
Building on the economic record of Silicon Valley, Professor Ronald
Gilson has posited that it was California’s restrictive approach to employee
noncompete agreements that provided the legal infrastructure supporting
368E.g., ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY
AND ROUTE 128 (1994).
369See Christine M. O’Malley, Note, Covenants Not to Compete in the Massachusetts Hi-Tech
Industry: Assessing the Need for a Legislative Solution, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1215, 1224 (1999) (citing
SAXENIAN, supra note 368, at 9).
370SAXENIAN, supra note 368, at 2–4 & 29–104.
371Id. at 2–3 & 29–57.
372Id. at 3–4 & 59–82.
373Id. at 161–62.
374Professor Gilson explains this portion of Saxenian’s work as follows: ‘‘In Saxenian’s
account, knowledge spillovers facilitated by the mobility of employees and the resulting bias
against vertical integration turned the entire industrial district into an engine of continuous
innovation, thereby transcending the life cycle of any single product.’’ Gilson, supra note 43, at
591. See also Hyde, supra note 339.
375Gilson, supra note 43, at 586 (‘‘These knowledge spillovers supercharge the innovative
capacity of the district with renewed agglomeration economies, facilitating the development of
new technologies that create a new industrial life cycle.’’).
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the economic growth of the region.376 That is, the culture of free mobility
of labor was a result of the legal hostility to employee noncompete
agreements in the state.377 In making that claim, Gilson noted the
differences between the California and Massachusetts approach to employ-
ee noncompete agreements378: Massachusetts follows the common law
reasonableness standard, which results in the enforcement of employee
noncompete agreements under some circumstances.379 Because California
prohibits almost all employee noncompete agreements,380 employee
mobility is restricted to a far greater extent in Massachusetts than in
California. To the extent that the difference between the two region’s
economic performances is attributable to California’s restrictive approach
to employee noncompete agreements, as Gilson contends, the success of
Silicon Valley provides some support for the argument that restricting
employee noncompete agreements can actually stimulate technological
innovation and economic growth.
A recent empirical study tested the contentions about the Silicon
Valley experience by examining data on employee mobility in Silicon
Valley and other cities.381 The authors found strong evidence that employ-
ees working in the computer industry in Silicon Valley have higher rates of
job mobility than in other cities with information-technology (IT) clus-
ters.382 This finding provides support for the arguments concerning
376See id. at 578 & 609 (‘‘Silicon Valley’s legal infrastructure, in the form of Business and
Profession Code section 16600’s prohibition of covenants not to compete, provided a pole
around which Silicon Valley’s characteristic business culture and structure precipitated.’’). See
also Hyde, supra note 339; Hanna Bui-Eve, Note, To Hire or Not to Hire: What Silicon Valley
Companies Should Know about Hiring Competitors’ Employees, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 981, 982–83 (1997).
But see Jason S. Wood, A Comparison of the Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete and Recent
Economic Histories of Four High Technology Regions, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 14 (2000), http://
www.vjolt.net/vol5/issue3/v5i3a14-Wood.html (ﬁnding no correlation between a region’s success
in the high-tech sector and differences in the enforceability of employee noncompete agreements).
377Gilson, supra note 43, at 603.
378Id. at 603–08.
379See, e.g., Boulanger v. Dunkin’ Donuts Inc., 815 N.E.2d 572, 574 (Mass. 2004) (discussing
covenants not to compete in a franchise context).
380See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
381Bruce Fallick et al., Job Hopping in Silicon Valley: The Micro-Foundations of a High Technology
Cluster, Oct. 23, 2003, http://www.nber.org/confer/2004/ents04/fallick.pdf.
382Id. at 29.
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knowledge spillovers and employee turnover in that region. Also, the
authors found some evidence of a ‘‘California effect,’’ because hypermo-
bility was found in IT clusters in other California cities.383 This provides
some support for the proposition that California’s restrictive policies on
employee noncompete agreements may have played a role in the Silicon
Valley success story, although the authors noted as a caveat that they had
no direct evidence that the high mobility was due to the California policy
on noncompete agreements as opposed to other factors, such as culture.384
Another empirical study found that laws restricting covenants not to
compete can increase innovation.385 However, the beneficial effects are
most likely to be realized in industries where small firms have an
innovative advantage over large firms.386 Thus, the study suggests that
the economic effects of noncompete agreements differ depending on the
particular industry and firm structure, but restrictions on such agreements
may support economic growth, particularly where there are R&D spillover
effects.387 The study further suggests that the law should focus more on
the effects of employee noncompete agreements on competition than on
the traditional factors under the common law reasonableness approach.388
The studies of the economics of employee noncompete agreements
are not conclusive, but they provide evidence of some positive economic
benefits from employee mobility and information sharing, at least in
certain fields. What economists and others have observed is likely the
result of some fundamental changes in the nature of a modern informa-
tion-based economy. In the new economy, innovation may actually be
facilitated by ‘‘information flow between participants in the innovative
process,’’ particularly in knowledge-intensive industries where much of the
383Id.
384Id. at 30.
385Deborah M. Weiss, Entrepreneurial Employees, http://www.utexas.edu/law/news/colloquium/
papers/Weisspaper.doc at 2 (last visited Oct. 4, 2007) (‘‘[N]onenforcement of noncompetes
stimulates economic growth in industries where innovation is dominated by small firms.’’).
386Id. at 17 (‘‘If laws restricting noncompetes are ever to have a positive effect, they should
have one in industries in which the small firms that employees might start have an innovative
advantage.’’).
387See id. at 34 (‘‘The analysis in the preceding Sections suggests that restricting noncompetes
can increase output if the workforce is heterogeneous or R&D has spillover effects.’’).
388See id. at 43–44.
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knowledge is undeveloped ideas.389 Also, there may be a significant
economic impact from new firms developing unrealized opportunities in
such knowledge-intensive environments.390 The existence of knowledge
spillovers may not be indicative of employees ‘‘stealing’’ proprietary
information to unfairly compete as much as it is evidence of employees
engaged in entrepreneurial activity by capitalizing on new ideas and
innovations that have not been commercialized by their employers.391 If
so, such knowledge spillovers and entrepreneurial activity may be critical
to economic growth in the new economy.
VIII. EMPLOYEE NONCOMPETE LAW: A DOCTRINAL
ANALYSIS AND ALTERNATIVE POLICY FRAMEWORK
The trend of recent decisions heightening the judicial scrutiny of employee
noncompete agreements is supported by the changing nature of the
employment relationship and bolstered by evidence as to the positive
economic effects of restricting employee noncompete agreements. To
some extent, the law of employee noncompete agreements can be adapted
to reflect these new market realities and to protect employee mobility. This
is particularly the case with respect to the protection of the goodwill
interest under noncompete agreements. We believe, however, that in the
context of noncompete agreements and trade secrets, an entirely new
policy approach is necessary.
A. Noncompete Agreements and the Goodwill Interest: Adapting Noncompete Law
to Protect Employee Mobility
The rationale for the protection of goodwill under noncompete agree-
ments is distinctly different from that for trade secrets.392 Any approach to
the law of employee noncompete agreements should recognize this
389THOMAS MANDEVILLE, UNDERSTANDING NOVELTY: INFORMATION, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, AND
THE PATENT SYSTEM 10 (1996).
390David B. Audretsch & Max Keilbach, The Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship (Dec.
2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
391Id.
392Compare supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text with supra notes 38–44 and accompany-
ing text.
2008 / Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete Agreements 173
distinction. In terms of the goodwill interest, employee noncompete
agreements directly protect the employer’s interest in customer relation-
ships.393 That is, by not being allowed to compete, the employee is
prevented from exploiting the relationships he or she developed working
for the employer. So, for example, a nonsolicitation agreement prevents a
former employee from contacting clients or customers of the former
employer on the theory that such relationships are part of the goodwill
owned by the employer.394 Moreover, without contractual restrictions on
postemployment competition, former employees would be free to take
advantage of those relationships,395 as any duty of loyalty to their former
employer has ended with the termination of the agency relationship.396
Thus, noncompete agreements directly prevent this misappropriation of
goodwill and thereby prevent a form of unfair competition.397
Carefully tailored noncompete agreements would allow employees to
compete but would not permit employees to compete unfairly by mis-
appropriating their employers’ goodwill. The recent decisions in BDO
Seidman,398 Freiburger,399 and Merrimack Valley400 represent the courts’
393See, e.g., Cohoon v. Fin. Plans & Strategies, Inc., 760 N.E.2d 190, 195 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)
(stating that ‘‘an employer is entitled to contract to protect the good will of the business,’’ but
stating that ‘‘secret or confidential information’’ is an element of this goodwill); Boldt Mach. &
Tools, Inc. v. Wallace, 366 A.2d 902, 906 (Pa. 1976) (‘‘[A]n employer has a protectible interest
in the customer goodwill developed by its employees.’’ (citations omitted)).
394Montville, supra note 367, at 1174.
395Blake, supra note 23, at 655 (courts have ‘‘generally agreed that in the absence of an express
contract, [an employee] may not be restrained from competing with his former employer nor
from soliciting his customers.’’).
396RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. c (2006) (‘‘An agent’s fiduciary duty to a
principal is generally coterminous with the duration of the agency relationship.’’).
397See, e.g.,. Manpower of Guilford County, Inc. v. Hedgecock, 257 S.E.2d 109, 114 (N.C.
App., 1979) (‘‘When the nature of employment such as in the instant case is such that
the employee has personal contact with the patrons and customers of an employer, or where the
employee acquires valuable information as to the nature and character of the business and the
names of patrons or customers, thereby enabling him to take advantage of such knowledge and
to compete unfairly with a former employer, equity may be interposed to prevent the breach of a
covenant not to compete which is reasonable as to time and territory.’’).
398712 N.E.2d 1220 (N.Y. 1999). See supra notes 152–61 and accompanying text discussing the
case.
399111 P.3d 100 (Idaho 2005). See supra notes 185–99 and accompanying text discussing the case.
400876 A.2d 757 (N.H. 2005). See supra notes 200–9 and accompanying text discussing the case.
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attempts to ensure that employee noncompete agreements are not over-
broad. This can be achieved under the prevailing common law reason-
ableness standard in one of two ways. First, as in BDO Seidman, the courts
can narrowly define the employer’s interest in goodwill. BDO Seidman
recognized a legitimate interest in protecting only those clients acquired by
the employee during the course of his employment.401 Any noncompete
agreement that attempted to prevent the employee from servicing clients
with whom the employee had no relationship at BDO Seidman was fatally
overbroad.402 Merrimack Valley’s ‘‘sphere of customer influence’’ is another
way to define the protectable interest in goodwill.403 By narrowly circum-
scribing that protectable interest, courts can ensure that noncompete
agreements are carefully tailored to prevent only unfair competition.
Alternatively, the courts can restrict the scope of employee noncom-
pete agreements to ensure that they are no broader than necessary to
protect the employer’s goodwill interest.404 The rule that an employee
noncompete agreement can only restrict a former employee from soliciting
clients with whom the employee had contacts reaches the same result;
however, its focus is on the breadth of the noncompete agreement rather
than the scope of the protectable interest.405 Regardless of the doctrinal
means by which the result is achieved, the common law reasonableness
standard can be adjusted in such a way as to prevent only those forms of
employee competition that exploit the former employer’s protectable
goodwill interest.
The law also needs to ensure that employers do not overreach,
drafting overbroad noncompete agreements with the expectation that, if
challenged, the court will reform the agreement. The movement to a rule
of reformation has some strong policy justifications. First, the rule is more
flexible than the blue pencil doctrine because the courts are not limited to
severing separate and distinct covenants.406 Second, reformation allows
401712 N.E.2d at 1225.
402Id.
403876 A.2d at 763–65.
404See supra Part V.B.
405See id.
406See supra notes 117–23 and accompanying text. See also Robert W. Emerson, Franchising
Covenants against Competition, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1049, 1055 n.20 (1995).
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partial enforcement of a noncompete agreement if the actual postemploy-
ment competition is unfair even though the terms of the agreement are
overbroad.407 From an equitable standpoint, the employee’s position in
such situations is not defensible, and the employer’s legitimate interests are
at risk. The downside of the rule of reformation is that it may encourage
employers to overreach because there is no penalty for requiring employ-
ees to sign an overbroad agreement. At the very least, the rule does not
discourage employers from broadly drafting their noncompete agree-
ments. The requirement of good faith is designed to act as a disincen-
tive,408 but it does not in practice provide a sufficient check on employer
overreaching. Because of this drawback of reformation, the more restric-
tive blue pencil doctrine adopted in Valley Medical Specialists409 has some
appeal.
Freiburger and Merrimack Valley demonstrate, however, that the rule of
reformation can be modified to provide a more potent disincentive.410
Courts should limit the power of reformation when enforcement of the
overbroad agreement would be unfair because of the conduct of the
employer. Freiburger focuses on the substance of the noncompete agree-
ment and the degree to which a covenant must be modified to render it
reasonable. If the covenant is facially overbroad, requiring substantial
modification by the courts, Freiburger does not permit reformation.411
Merrimack Valley focuses on the procedural fairness of partially enforcing an
overbroad agreement through reformation. Factors indicating a lack of
good faith from a procedural standpoint include whether the agreement
was discussed during negotiations and whether the employer used unfair
bargaining power to secure the agreement.412 Ultimately, a good faith
‘‘fairness’’ standard that has some teeth to it emerges from these cases. If
adopted, such a standard would still allow reformation, but would require
a higher level of fair dealing between the parties for the courts to exercise
their equitable powers to grant reformation.
4075 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 2:3 (14th ed. 1993).
408See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the good faith standard.
409982 P.2d 1277, 1286 (Ariz. 1999).
410See supra notes 185–96 & 200–09 and accompanying text.
411111 P.3d 100, 107–08 (Idaho 2005).
412876 A.2d at 764–65.
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Overall, the emerging law of employee noncompete agreements
provides rules and doctrines to ensure that noncompete covenants are
not overbroad in the protection of the employer’s interest in goodwill. In
this context, the law can be adjusted to reflect the heightened concern for
employee mobility.
B. Trade Secrets and Noncompete Agreements
In contrast to noncompete agreements designed for the protection of
goodwill, agreements designed to protect trade secrets do not directly
prevent trade secret misappropriation or forestall unfair competition by
competing former employees. An employee who starts a new business or
goes to work for a competitor without using or disclosing the former
employer’s trade secrets is not engaged in unfair competition. The
employer’s trade secret interest is only jeopardized if the employee
exploits this information for his own commercial advantage or for the
advantage of his new employer. A noncompete covenant in this context is
designed as a prophylactic measure to protect against the potential of a
trade secret misappropriation. But, as with all preventative legal measures,
the noncompete instrument is necessarily overbroad and there is a serious
risk of overdeterrence.413 That danger of overdeterrence is compounded
by the in terrorem effect that the mere existence of a noncompete agreement
may have on an employee. Employees may not fully appreciate the
nuances of noncompete law or be fearful of the costs of litigation.414 As a
result, employees may be unwilling to engage in competitive activity,
regardless of the enforceability of the noncompete agreement. Moreover,
prospective employers may be deterred from hiring employees subject to
noncompete agreements, fearful of potential legal claims for intentional
interference with contracts or unfair competition.
In contrast to noncompete agreements designed to protect goodwill,
it is difficult, if not impossible, to tailor a trade secret noncompete
agreement so that it only prohibits an employee from competing in an
413See Blake, supra note 23, at 651 (‘‘As a risk-distributing device the restraint on future
employment is neither particularly efficient nor fair.’’).
414See, e.g., House of Vision, Inc. v. Hiyane, 225 N.E.2d 21, 25 (Ill. 1967) (‘‘To stake out
unrealistic boundaries in time and space, as the employer did in this case, is to impose upon an
employee the risk of proceeding at his peril, or the burden of expensive litigation to ascertain
the scope of his obligation.’’).
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unfair way, namely, by using or disclosing trade secrets. Only confidenti-
ality and nondisclosure agreements directly prevent misappropriation. In
fact, employee noncompete agreements tend to be standardized agree-
ments whose restrictions are not bounded by trade secret usage, but rather
by time, geography, and scope of activities restrained.415 Also, employers
often have an incentive to draft overbroad noncompete agreements for
several reasons. Anticipating or predicting what trade secret information
needs to be protected and the types of harmful competitive activities in
which an employee might engage at some future time is problematic.416
Moreover, in many states, courts will reform an overbroad noncompete
agreement.417 The legal risks of imposing an overbroad agreement on
employees, therefore, may be minimal in many jurisdictions. Thus,
noncompete agreements designed to protect trade secrets will not be
carefully tailored to prevent unfair competition,418 the result of which will
be overdeterrence of employees and a potentially anticompetitive effect on
the market.
C. A New Policy Framework for Postemployment Restraints on Competition:
Utilizing the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine to Balance the Competing Interests in
Employee Mobility and Trade Secrets
Any change in the law of employee noncompete agreements should be
sensitive to the overriding need to protect employee mobility and the
positive and negative economic costs of enforcing noncompete agree-
ments. Under our proposed framework, trade secrets would not be
considered a protectable interest under employee noncompete agree-
ments. Instead, our framework relies on nondisclosure and confidentiality
agreements to protect trade secrets in the postemployment context, similar
to the approach in California. Our framework deviates from the California
415See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility: The Dilution of Employee
Bargaining Power via Standard Form Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 963, 980–81 (2006).
416Blake, supra note 23, at 699.
417See supra note 117.
418E.g., Comprehensive Techs. Int’l v. Software Artisans, 3 F.3d 730, 738–39 (1993) (reversing
district court ruling that the noncompete agreement was ‘‘categorically’’ overbroad and
enforcing prohibition against the employee ‘‘working for a competitor of [employer] in any
capacity’’ because trade secrets were at stake), vacated and appeal dismissed per stipulation, No.
92–1837, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 28601 (4th Cir. Sept. 30, 1993).
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approach in that it not only permits, but relies heavily on, the inevitable
disclosure doctrine to balance the competing interests in employee
mobility and trade secret protection.419
Nondisclosure and confidentiality agreements, if enforced rigorously
by the courts, prevent the unfair exploitation of trade secrets, while
allowing free competition by former employees. The traditional arguments
against this approach are threefold. First, there are procedural difficulties
associated with establishing trade secret misappropriation.420 Therefore,
traditional remedies may be difficult to secure, which will make it more
likely that former employees will misappropriate trade secrets when they
start competing firms or go to work for competitors.421 Second, there is a
risk of underdeterrence if employment cannot be restrained.422 Finally,
irreparable injury may occur if an employer cannot prevent in advance the
use or disclosure of trade secrets by employees.423 The remedy of damages
may not be adequate in some situations. Thus, an injunctive remedy
preventing postemployment competition is critical to the protection of
trade secrets.
However, the development of the inevitable disclosure doctrine,
along with other changes in trade secret law, suggests that these drawbacks
may not be as important as once thought. Trade secret owners have broad
protection for trade secret information under the UTSA,424 adopted in the
vast majority of states.425 The UTSA expands the scope of trade secret
protection, which employers have used to protect the sort of soft manage-
419See supra notes 302–10 and accompanying text for a discussion of the California approach.
420See supra note 43 and accompanying text. See also Everett J. Prescott, Inc. v. Ross, 390 F.
Supp. 2d 44, 46 (D. Me. 2005) (noting that proving a violation of a nondisclosure agreement
presents ‘‘evidentiary difficulties’’ (citing Bernier v. Merrill Air Eng’rs, 770 A.2d 97, 104 (Me.
2001))).
421See Rubin & Shedd, supra note 354, at 96–97 (noting workers have an economic incentive
for ‘‘opportunistic behavior’’ once they leave a firm in possession of valuable information).
422See Blake, supra note 23, at 669–70 (‘‘Even in the best of good faith, a former technical or
‘creative’ employee working for a competitor, or in business for himself in the same or a
related field, can hardly prevent his knowledge of his former employer’s confidential methods
or data from showing up in his work.’’).
423Id.
424Unif. Trade Secrets Act §§ 1–11 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 434 (1990).
425See supra note 256 for a list of states that have adopted the UTSA.
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rial trade secrets in PepsiCo426 and EarthWeb.427 Also, the UTSA provides
holders with substantial remedies, including multiple damages when
misappropriation is willful428 and injunctive relief when there is evidence
of an actual or threatened misappropriation.429 This protection has
recently been fortified by the passage of the Economic Espionage Act,430
which imposes criminal penalties for trade secret misappropriation and
economic espionage. Finally, the inevitable disclosure doctrine should
provide the necessary injunctive relief when there is a high probability
of trade secret misappropriation but no direct evidence of misappropria-
tion.
Although the doctrine of inevitable disclosure has been criticized by
both courts and commentators,431 the critique loses much of its force if
employee noncompete agreements are not allowed to protect trade secret
information. The primary criticism of the doctrine is that it creates a de
facto noncompete agreement, without the employee’s consent, and there-
by expands the protection the employer has under a confidentiality or
nondisclosure agreement.432 As a consequence, critics argue that the
remedy upsets the delicate balance struck by employee noncompete law
in terms of the parties’ competing interests and threatens the employee’s
interest in mobility.433 But if the doctrine provides the sole means by which
a noncompete injunction can be obtained, the employee’s interest in
mobility is more than adequately protected.
426Supra note 271 and accompanying text.
427Supra notes 312–24 and accompanying text.
428Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 3 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 434 (1990). See also Lucini Italia Co.
v. Grappolini, No. 01 C 6405, 2003 WL 1989605, at n58–59 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2003) (awarding
$1 million in punitive damages under the Illinois Trade Secret Act for willful misappropria-
tion).
429Unif. Trade Secret Act § 2 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 434 (1990).
43018 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839 (2000).
431See supra Part VI.C.
432See Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120 (S.D. Cal. 1999)
(noting that the theory of inevitable disclosure of trade secrets can create a de facto covenant
not to compete). See also supra note 285 and accompanying text.
433See, e.g., EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff ’d, 205 F.3d
1322 (2d Cir. 2000).
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In fact, one can argue that employees are provided greater protec-
tion under this approach than under the common law reasonableness test.
First, the proposed approach eliminates or minimizes the in terrorem effects
of employee noncompete agreements.434 The doctrine may have a similar
deterrent effect, but it will primarily affect employees contemplating
competitive activities where trade secret misuse is probable, an effect that
is necessary to protect the interests of trade secret holders and prevent
unfair competition. Second, it substitutes a carefully framed injunction
based on demonstrated necessity (inevitability) for what is often an overb-
road noncompete agreement based only on the potential for trade secret
misappropriation. If the employee’s right to compete is going to be
restricted because of such necessity, then the court should be able to
fashion a more limited remedy than under an employee noncompete
agreement, one that more directly considers the employee’s interest in
mobility and the probable harm to the employer’s trade secrets.
Courts have been able to confine the use of the inevitable disclosure
doctrine so as to ensure that the employer’s trade secrets are protected
while not unduly restricting the employee’s freedom of mobility. By
requiring a showing that disclosure of trade secrets is a virtual certainty,
courts can ensure that injunctions on competition will not be imposed
based merely on the potential of trade secret misappropriation.435 Most
courts have adopted the position that inevitable disclosure will not be
inferred from the mere knowledge of or exposure to proprietary business
information.436 In determining inevitability, courts should also closely
scrutinize claims of trade secret status, particularly the broad claims
relating to soft trade secrets.437 Intimate and extensive knowledge of
434See supra note 414 and accompanying text for a description of the in terrorem effects of
noncompete agreements.
435E.g., Cintas Corp. v. Perry, No. 03 C 8404, 2004 WL 2032124, at n58–59 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20,
2004) (rejecting as mere speculation the employer’s inevitable disclosure argument where
there was no evidence of actual misappropriation during the eight months the former
employee worked for a new employer).
436E.g., Omnitech Int’l, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 11 F.3d. 1316, 1325 (5th Cir. 1994) (‘‘Certainly
‘misappropriation’ of a trade secret means more than simply using knowledge gained through
a variety of experiences. . . .’’); APAC Teleservices v. McRae, 985 F. Supp. 852, 860–62 (N.D.
Iowa 1997) (finding knowledge of trade secrets insufficient, even with evidence of untrust-
worthiness of the former employee).
437See, e.g., Square D Co. v. Handel, No. 04-C-775, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21480, at n22–23
(E.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2005) (questioning whether pricing information should be protected as a
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legitimate and highly valuable (and vulnerable) trade secrets should
become a precondition to a finding of inevitable disclosure. Moreover,
many courts have insisted on strong evidence of wrongful intent before
concluding that misappropriation is truly inevitable.438 The emerging
post-PepsiCo standard incorporates that key intent factor of the common
law within its analytical framework.439
Courts applying a demanding standard of inevitable disclosure also
have crafted limited injunctions, carefully considering the employer’s and
employee’s competing interests.440 An illustrative example is DoubleClick,
Inc. v. Henderson,441 in which the court granted a six-month noncompete
injunction against former high-level executives of an Internet advertising
business who intended to start up a competing business.
In DoubleClick, the former employees, David Henderson and Jeffrey
Dickey, decided to leave DoubleClick, the dominant force in Internet
advertising, to start a new company, Alliance Interactive Networks.442
Dickey was vice president of business development at DoubleClick.
Henderson was vice president of North American advertising sales,
responsible for managing DoubleClick’s sales force and a member of the
firm’s management team. They were privy to sensitive information that
DoubleClick claimed as trade secrets, including revenue projections, plans
for future projects, pricing and product strategies, and databases with
trade secret except in extraordinary circumstances). See also Schwan’s v. Home Run Inn, Inc.,
No. 05-2763, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32879, at n16–17 (D. Minn. Dec. 9, 2005) (finding no
inevitable disclosure where the employer did not specifically identify confidential informa-
tion).
438See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral Co., 899 F. Supp. 1477, 1482–83 (W.D.N.C.
1995) (holding that North Carolina case law requires a showing of the employee’s bad faith to
grant an injunction under the doctrine of inevitable disclosure); Danielle Pasqualone, Note,
GlobeSpan, Inc. v. O’Neill, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 251, 268 (2002) (noting that most post-
PepsiCo cases require a showing of ‘‘dishonesty or bad faith’’ and citing examples).
439See supra notes 287–98 and accompanying text for a discussion of H & R Block Eastern Tax
Services, Inc. v. Enchura, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (W.D. Mo. 2000), and the inevitability-plus
standard adopted by a number of courts following PepsiCo.
440E.g., Merck & Co., Inc. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1464–65 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (enjoining
the former employee only from discussing specific trade secret information with the new
employer).
441No. 116914/97, 1997 WL 731413 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 7, 1997).
442Id. at n3.
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client information.443 In July 1977 Henderson and Dickey started plan-
ning for their new company by developing a business plan and seeking out
investors.444 In September 1997 Henderson was fired after their plan was
discovered.445 His confiscated laptop contained Alliance’s business plan
and a ‘‘Stakeholder Positioning Analysis,’’ which contained information on
DoubleClick’s contracts that Henderson and Dickey apparently intended
to use in luring away advertising clients from DoubleClick.446 Also, while
working for DoubleClick, Henderson and Dickey had solicited one of its
clients for their new business and solicited financing from one of Dou-
bleClick’s competitors.447
DoubleClick sought an injunction against the planned advertising
venture based on misappropriation of trade secrets and breach of loy-
alty.448 The court first examined whether the information to which
Henderson and Dickey were privy constituted protected trade secrets.449
Henderson and Dickey argued that the information was not confidential
because it was publicly disclosed by DoubleClick.450 Although some
advertising rates were posted on DoubleClick’s Web sites, the court found
that DoubleClick did not reveal the actual financing arrangements with
clients nor other information, such as the number of hits on specific
Internet advertisements.451 The court concluded that there was an actual
misappropriation of trade secrets and a ‘‘high probability of inevitable
disclosure,’’ given the improper use by Henderson and Dickey, the
planned venture, and their ‘‘cavalier attitude toward their duties to their
former employer.’’452
443Id. at n2.
444Id. at n3.
445Id.
446Id. at n5.
447Id. at n6.
448Id. at n1.
449Id. at n3–n6.
450Id. at n4.
451Id.
452Id. at n5–6.
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In fashioning a remedy, however, the court rejected DoubleClick’s
request for a broad, one-year injunction. It found that the requested
injunction was not sufficiently tailored in several respects. First, it would
have prevented Henderson and Dickey from working in any advertising
position or firm, even if the position or business was not in the Internet
advertising arena.453 Second, the proposed one-year period was too long
given the rapid speed with which the online advertising environment
changes.454 Therefore, it granted an injunction for only six months and
limited it to direct competitive activity.455
In contrast to the approach of the court in DoubleClick, courts
applying the traditional common law reasonableness test frequently
enforce employee noncompete agreements regardless of any demon-
strated need to protect trade secrets. A recent example is Nike, Inc. v.
McCarthy.456 McCarthy, a twenty-year employee of Nike signed a non-
compete agreement that prevented him from working for a competitor for
a one-year postemployment period.457 At the time of his departure from
Nike, McCarthy was in the position of global sales for Brand Jordan.458
Facing what he believed was an imminent demotion, he took a position
with Reebok as vice president for U.S. footwear sales and marketing.459 In
Nike’s suit to enforce the noncompete agreement, the court strictly
enforced the agreement without any consideration of the legitimacy of
the trade secret claims or necessity of an injunction. In fact, the court
rejected any consideration of whether his employment resulted in a threat
of trade secret misappropriation.460 Concluding that a severance package
453Id. at n8.
454Id.
455Id.
456285 F. Supp. 2d 1242 (D. Or. 2003), aff ’d, 379 F.3d 576 (9th Cir. 2004).
457Id. at 1244.
458Id. at 1245.
459Id.
460The court stated its reasoning as follows:
The fact that defendant may not have used any confidential information in his new
position with Reebok only shows that he has not violated other provisions of the non-
compete agreement. What remains is that the parties agreed to abide by the terms of the
non-compete regardless of any demonstrated specific need. I allowed considerable
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was sufficient to protect McCarthy, the court approved a broad injunction
under the terms of the noncompete agreement. McCarthy was restrained
from taking any position at Reebok or any other business in the athletic
footwear or apparel business that was a competitor of Nike or its affiliated
entities.461
A comparison of cases like DoubleClick and Nike suggests that the
inevitable disclosure doctrine may establish a preferable legal framework
within which to determine whether a former employee should be pre-
vented from competing and, if so, how extensive that restriction should be
in order to protect an employer’s trade secrets. Employee noncompete
agreements often overprotect trade secrets at the expense of the employ-
ee’s interest in mobility and society’s interest in open competition.
Inevitable disclosure, although criticized by commentators and courts,
may provide the flexibility necessary to correctly balance the rights of
employers and employees with regard to trade secrets and postemploy-
ment competition.
IX. CONCLUSION
This article suggests that an alternative policy framework is necessary to
align the law of employee noncompete agreements with the changes
occurring in the workplace and the economy. Recent cases demonstrate
that the common law reasonableness test can be adapted to prevent
overbroad noncompete agreements designed to protect the goodwill of a
former employer. By limiting that goodwill interest to the customer
relationships developed by the former employee, the ‘‘sphere of customer
influence,’’ the courts can limit the breadth of noncompete covenants in
this setting. If the power of reformation is similarly restricted by the courts,
a proper balance will be struck between an employee’s interest in mobility
and the employer’s interest in protecting its customer relationships.
leeway in the testimony and evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding
defendant’s separation from Nike and his assumption of duties with Reebok for the
limited purpose of determining whether enforcement of the contract would be un-
conscionable and I find nothing to support such a conclusion.
Id. at 1245–46.
461Id. at 1247–48.
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Our proposed framework employs a new policy approach for the
protection of trade secrets in the postemployment context. We propose a
decoupling of trade secret protection from employee noncompete law.
Under this proposal, trade secrets would not be considered a legitimate
interest justifying an employee noncompete agreement. Trade secrets
would continue to be protected from actual or threatened misappropria-
tion under confidentiality agreements and trade secret laws. Most impor-
tantly, courts would be empowered to prevent employment of a former
employee under the inevitable disclosure doctrine. Such an approach
would support a climate of employee mobility and information sharing
while providing businesses with an appropriate level of protection for their
goodwill and trade secrets.
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